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IN THE SUPREME COTJRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ROBERT JORDA.""l, JR. , and 
TERRY FULLMER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case Nos. 18235 & 18236 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants were tried and found guilty of violating 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended, which provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a 
minor who knowingly employs, uses, persuades, 
induces, entices or coerces any minor to pose in the 
nude for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person 
or for profit or to engage in any sexual or 
simulated sexual conduct for the purpose of photo-
graphing, filming, recording or displaying in any 
way the sexual or simulated sexual conduct. 
(2) Any person who photographs, films, or records, 
in any way minors in the nude for the purpose of 
sexual arousal of any person or for profit or 
engaged in any sexual or simulated sexual conduct is 
guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor. 
(3) Any person who displays, distributes, possesses 
for the purpose of distributing, or sells material 
depicting minors in the nude or engaging in sexual 
or simulated sexual conduct is guilty of sexual 
exploitation of minors. 
(4) It is not a defense to this section that the 
person who is charged with sexual exploitation of a 
minor is parent, legal guardian or other person 
exercising legal control of the child who was the 
subject of the exploitation. 
(5) A violation of this section is a felony of the 
second degree. 
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Under Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1201(6) (1953), as 
am e na ea , " nu a i t y n is t hu s de f in ea : 
(6) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or 
female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less 
than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female 
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any 
portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the 
depiction of covered male genitals in a discernably 
turgid state. 
"Sexual conduct" is defined in Utah Code Ann., 
§ 7 6- l 0-12 0 1 ( 7 ) : 
(7) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, 
sexual intercourse, or any touching of a person's 
clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, 
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone 
or between members of the same or opposite sex or 
between humans and animals in an act of apparent or 
actual sexual stimulation or gratification. 
From the guilty verdict, rendered in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, by Judge J. Robert Bullock, on 
December 14, 1981, the appellants appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellants were tried on December 9, 1981, in a 
bench trial before J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah, in and for Utah County. The appellants 
were found guilty, and both were sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for a period not to exceed five years and fined $250. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the convictions. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 3, 1981, Officer J. Stewart Winn of the Orem 
Police Department applied for a search warrant for 754 south 50 
East, Orem, Utah, to search for snapshots indicative of the sexual 
exploitation of a minor. In the affidavit for the search warrant 
(Appendix "A"), Officer Winn stated that he had received 
information from a confidential informant that a quantity of nude 
photographs which pictured Holly Wilkerson, a minor, and Robert 
Jordan and Terry Fullmer "engaging in or simulating sex acts" (R. 
4).1 The search warrant issued by Judge Sumsion (Appendix "B") 
authorized the search during the daylight hours of the appellants' 
residence, "for the presence therein of child pornography and 
other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor" (R. 6). The 
premises were searched on November 3, 1981 (R. 81), and various 
items were seized, including, according to the inventory of 
property taken from the residence (Appendix "C"), assorted instant 
photographs, unexposed 33-mm. film, flash cubes, a cloth sack, 
unexposed Polaroid film and a General Electric color television 
set (R. 5). Approximately 225 photographs were seized (R. 82), of 
which approximately 30 pictured Holly Wilkerson (see Exhibits 
1-30). 
On November 4, 1981, a criminal information was filed 
against the appellants (Appendix "D"), charging them with the 
violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended, 
lReferences to the trial record will be designated as 
R. 
-3-
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sexual exploitation of a minor: 
(R. 2). 
.. in that they, at the time and place aforesaid, 
knowingly and intentionally used, persuaded, induced 
or enticed Holly Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the 
nude while simulating sexual conduct for the purpose 
of photographing, filming, recording, or displaying 
sexual or simulating sexual conduct. 
On November 9, 1981, Jordan filed a Notice of Claim that 
the materials seized under the search warrant were not 
pornographic (R. 7). A hearing on whether the materials seized 
were pornographic was not held. 
Appellants moved to suppress the evidence seized on the 
ground that the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued was 
defective in that it set forth hearsay allegations of a police 
informant, contained misrepresentations concerning the materials 
set out to be seized, and failed to comply with the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(1) (1953), as amended, in that no 
materials were attached to the affidavit. The motions further 
asserted that the requirements of Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1212(3) 
(1953), as amended, were not followed in that the magistrate 
failed to hold a hearing within seven days of the Notice alleging 
the materials not to be pornographic, that in executing the 
warrant, the police officers exceeded the bounds of the warrant by 
seizing materials which were outside the scope of the warrant, and 
that the warrant did not specify with sufficient particularity the 
items to be seized (R. 15, 24-25). 
A hearing to suppress evidence was held December 7, 
1981, wherein the above arguments were made by appellants and were 
rejected by the court (R. 72-110). 
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On December 9, 19 81, the appellants were tried without a 
jury by J. Robert Bullock. At trial, 30 of the photographs seized 
under the warrant were introduced into evioence over the 
appellants' objections (R. 128, Exhibits 1-30). The evidence 
indicated that the photographs were taken by Robert Jordan and 
were posed at his direction on approximately September 15, 1981 
(R. 123-127). 
Although conflicting evidence arose as to whether the 
appellants were aware that Holly Wilkerson was only 14 years of 
age at the time the photographs were taken (R. 134-136, 143-144), 
the trial court specifically found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendants did know, primarily upon the testimony of Mrs. 
Wilkerson (Holly's mother), that both appellants knew that Holly 
Wilkerson was a minor at the time the photographs were taken (R. 
49). 
Despite the appellants' contentions that the court made 
no ruling on whether the photographs contained "simulated sex 
acts," and that no actual sex acts took place on the date the 
photographs were taken, the trial court found the appellants 
guilty of knowingly and intentionally using, persuading, inducing 
or enticing Holly Wilkerson to pose in the nude for the purpose of 
photographing, filming, recording, or displaying sexual or 
simulating sexual conduct, according to the charge in the 
information (R. 49). 
The appellants were each sentenced to a term not to 
exceed five years at the Utah State Prison and to pay a fine of 
$250.00. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE THERE ARE NO SPEECH OR EXPRESSION 
ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN THE ACT OF SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR, A FIRST AMENDMENT 
ANALYSIS IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE~ 
Although the appellants have characterized this case as 
one in which First Amendment issues abound, the respondent submits 
that since there are no speech or expression issues involved in 
the act of sexual exploitation of a minor, the appellants have no 
standing to raise First Amendment arguments. 
The recent United States Supreme Court case of New York 
v. Ferber, U.S. , 31 Cr.L.R. 3139 (1982) (Appendix "E"), 
has lain to rest most of the issues raised by the appellants. Up 
until the time of the Ferber decision, the issue of what 
protection, if any, was to be afforded the production and 
distribution of "child pornography" had not been uniformly decided 
throughout the country. Many courts had treated the issues of 
production and distribution of child pornography within the 
context of the First Amendment. Others had seen issues of 
privacy, police protection of health, safety, and morals, or the 
power of the state to regulate minors. Indeed, some courts, 
including the court from which the Ferber case was appealed, found 
as controlling many issues raised by the appellants in this case. 
The confusion and lack of uniformity between the federal districts 
and among state courts was resolved by the landmark decision in 
Ferber, in which the United States Supreme Court specifically held 
that the distribution of child porn~raphy was not protected under 
-6-
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the First Arnenament and expressly recognized that the production 
of such was also unprotected.2 
Ferber arose when the proprietor of a Manhattan, New 
York bookstore sold to an undercover police officer two films 
depicting young boys masturbating. He was indicted under the New 
York laws controlling the dissemination of child pornography and 
found guilty. 
The New York statute provides:· 
A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual 
performance if knowing the character and content 
thereof he employs, authorizes, or induces a child 
less than 16 years of age to engage in a sexual 
performance or being a parent, legal guardian or 
custodian of such child, he consents to the 
participation by such child in a sexual performance. 
A "sexual performance" is defined as: 
Any performance or part thereof which includes 
sexual conduct by a child less than 16 years of age. 
"Sexual conduct" is in turn defined as: 
Actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate 
sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, 
sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the 
genitals. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3140. 
2Thus, the decisions cited as controlling by the 
appellants--Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972), Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City 
of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
402 U.S. 205 (1975), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), 
People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), Graham 
v. Hill, 444 F.Supp. 584 (W.D. Tex. 1978), People v. Kahan, 15 
N.Y.2d 311, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965), St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. 
Carey, 440 F.Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), Horne Box Office, Inc. v. 
Wilkinson, Civil No. C 81-0331J (C.D. Utah 1982)--are rendered 
inapplicable to the extent that they contravene the holding in 
Ferber. Ferber, being dispositive of the child pornography issue, 
must control. 
-7-
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After a series of appeals, the decision of the latest of 
which is referred to as controlling by the appellants, the Court 
granted New York State's petition for certiorari to definitively 
" 
decide the following question: 
To prevent the abuse of children who are made to 
engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, 
could the New York State Legislature, consistent 
with the First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination 
of material which shows children engaged in sexual 
conduct, regardless of whether such material is 
obscene? 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3141. 
In upholding Ferber's conviction, the Court set out five 
specific reasons behind the holding that states are entitled to 
far greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of 
children than in the regulation of other materials. (These five 
reasons are set out in detail and analyzed within the context of 
this case in Point III of this brief.) In finding that child 
pornography is a special class of material, the distribution of 
which is not protected under traditional First Amendment rights, 
the Ferber court specifically rejected the test set out in Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972), for determining whether a 
sexual depiction of a child is obscene. 
While Ferber dealt specifically with the protections to 
be given distribution of child pornography, the case at bar 
involves the production of child pornography, which is at least 
one step removed from distribution. However, in Ferber, the Court 
recognized that the production of child pornography is "an 
activity illegal throughout the nation." 31 Cr.L.R. at 3143. 
-8-
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After noting that "the federal government and forty-
seven states have sought to combat the problem with statutes 
specifically directed at the production of child pornography," (31 
Cr.L.R. at 3140, citing specifically the Utah statute in question 
in the instant case--see fn. 1, Id., at 3140), the Court, quoting 
Gibboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U.S. 490 (1949), 
stated: 
It rarely has been suggested that the 
constitutional freedom for speech and press 
extends its immunity to speech or writing used 
as an integral part of conduct in violation of 
a valid criminal statute. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3143. The Court implicitly recognized the 
constitutionality of statutes which prohibit the production of 
child pornography. The Ferber court found that because the 
distribution of child pornography was an integral part of the 
production of child pornography, proscribed by law throughout the 
nation, "and the constitutionality of these laws have not been 
questioned" (31 Cr.L.R. at 3143), any First Amendment protections 
given the distribution of pornography would be outweighed by the 
State's interest in enforcing its constitutional laws. The Court 
found no First Amendment protection in the production of child 
pornography or sexual exploitation of children. 
The valid legislative purpose in passing child 
pornography laws is the protection of children and youth from 
sexual exploitation and abuse. See 31 Cr.L.R. at 3142. This 
legislative purpose has been recognized by the appellant (see 
Appellants' Brief at page 5). The production of child 
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pornography is directly related to the sexual exploitation and 
abuse of children which the child pornography statutes, including 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5, are designed to proscribe. There 
are, however, no speech or expression activities involved in 
employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a 
minor to pose in the nude for the purpose of sexual arousal or for 
profit, or to engage in sexual or simulated sexual conduct any 
more than there are speech or expression activities involved in 
rape, robbery, or murder. Thus, the appellants' assertions 
notwithstanding, in dealing with the production of child 
pornography, a First Amendment expression analysis is inapposi te. 
Whether the material resulting from exploitation and/or abuse of a 
minor has value which would be otherwise protected under the First 
Amendment or not is a secondary consideration, if a consideration 
at all, to the State's interest in prohibiting exploitation and 
abuse of minors in the first place, for whatever reason. Thus, 
the cases cited by the appellants regarding the right of the 
public, even children, to view material protected under the 
decisions enunciated in Miller v. California; Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. City of 
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); and Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 4022 U.S. 205 (1975), are inapplicable. Those cases 
dealt with the invalidity of statutes designed to keep children 
from exposure to nudity, ideas, and other material which would, in 
the context of adult viewing, be entitled to First Amendment 
protections. Those cases did not deal with the exploitation 
and/or abuse of children in the production of child pornography. 
-10-
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In recognizing that the standard First Amendment Miller analysis 
is inadequate in treating the problem of the sexual abuse and 
exploitation of children through child pornography, the Ferber 
court stated: 
The Miller standard, like all general definitions of 
what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the 
State's particular and more compelling interest in 
prosecuting those who promote the sexual 
exploitation of children. Thus, the question under 
the Miller test of whether a work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest of the average 
person bears no connection to the issue of whether a 
child has been physically or psychologically harmed 
in the production of the work. Similarly, a 
sexually explicit depiction need not be "patently 
offensive" in order to have required the sexual 
exploitation of a child for its production. In 
addition, a work which, taken on the whole, contains 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value may nevertheless embody the hardest core of 
child pornography. "It is irrelevant· to the child 
[who has been abused] whether or not the material 
... has a literary, artistic, political, or social 
value." Memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in Support 
of § 263.15. We therefore cannot conclude that the 
Miller standard is a satisfactory solution to the 
child pornography problem. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3143. 
Nor are the cases of Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Gambino v. Fairfax Countv School 
Board, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); or Shanlev v. Northeast 
Independent School District of Bexar County, Texas, 462 F.2d 960 
(5th Cir. 1972), applicable to the case at hand. Those cases, 
which involved the expression of ideas through wearing armbands, 
publishing student newspapers, and distributing student 
newspapers, were directly related to First Amendment issues. In 
the instant case, there are no First Amendment issues. Here, 
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there is no expression of ideas through the photographs involved. 
First Amendment expression arguments are simply not applicable. 
This case, then, must be analyzed by the same standards as any 
other case in which free speech issues are not involved. Under 
those standards, the appellants' convictions must stand. 
POINT II 
EVEN WERE FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATIONS AT ISSUE 
IN THE INSTANT CASE, UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-10-
1206.5, AS APPLIED AGAINST THE APPELLANTS, rs 
NOT AN OVERBROAD INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT TO 
FREE SPEECH OR EXPRESSION, AND THE APPELLANTS 
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RAISE THE OVERBREADTH 
ISSUE IN THEIR DEFENSE. 
Even were there free speech issues in the instant case, 
the appellants have no standing to challenge Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-10-1206.5, either on its face on the basis of the possible 
application of the statute to thir~ persons, or as applied to 
them. 
In Points I and III of their brief, the appellants argue 
that the State's position appears to be that nudity in and of 
itself is a sufficient violation of the law to justify conviction. 
Further, the appellants argue that when the definition of nudity 
is read into Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5, the statute is 
rendered hopelessly overbroad. To illustrate their point, in 
fact, the appellants have attached to their brief a greeting card 
which, under their reading of the statute, involved "nudity for 
profit," and would thus be proscribed by law. 
-12-
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In this case, the appellants have no standing to raise a 
"parade of horribles." Under the information charging the 
appellants with sexual exploitation of a minor, no charge or 
mention of photographing a minor in the nude for profit was made. 
Rather, the information filed against the appellants narrowly 
states: 
The undersigned Pete Hansen under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendants committed 
the crimes of: 
sexual exploitation of a minor, a second-degree 
felony, at Utah County, Utah, on or about September 
15, 1981, in violation of § 76-10-1206.5, Utah 
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, at the time 
and place aforesaid, knowingly and intentionally 
used, persuaded, induced, or enticed Holly 
Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the nude while 
simulating sexual conduct for the purpose of photo-
graphing, filming, recording, or displaying sexual 
or simulated sexual conduct. 
( R . 2 ) ( s e e Append ix " C " ) . 
Since Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5 is worded in the 
disjunctive, i.e.: 
A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor 
who knowingly employs, uses, persuades, induces, 
entices or coerces any minor to pose in the nude for 
the purpose of sexual arousal of any person or for 
profit or to engage in any sexual or simulated 
sexual conduct ... , 
neither a recitation in the complaint nor a finding by the trial 
court of posing in the nude for prof it was necessary. There was 
no problem in charging and finding the appellants guilty of sexual 
exploitation of a minor without any mention of nudity for profit. 
Thus, at this point in the proceedings, the appellants are 
-13-
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petitioning this Court for a Declaratory Judgment on a statutory 
interpretation which has not been applied to them. This petition 
should be ignored. 
Because the appellants were not charged with photo-
graphing a minor in the nude for profit, the respondent submits 
that they have no standing to assert the defense of overbreadth of 
the statute based on a reading of "nudity for profit." See State 
v. Phillips, Utah, 540 P.2d 936 (1975): 
Also important to be considered as pertaining to the 
problem in this case, is the principle that no one 
should be entitled to challenge a statute and have 
it declared void because it may unjustly affect 
someone else, but could properly do so only if his 
own rights are adversely affected. 
Id. at 940. See also: Dileo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 
1976). This, coupled with the fact that the appellants have never 
asserted that the statute was erroneously applied to them, should 
preclude the appellants from raising any possible "overbreadth"-
issues as they may affect third persons, under either the United 
States or Utah Constitutions. 
The appellants assert standing to facially challenge 
Ut~ Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended, now as it may 
affect third persons based on Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 930 
(1975), stating: 
Appellants in this case, then, clearly have the 
right to challenge the statute in question, even if 
the acts alleged by the State in this particular 
instance could validly be prohibited. 
See appellants' brief, page 7. Doran, however, is distinguishable 
both on its facts and in its holding, and is inapplicable in 
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determining the appellants' standing. In Doran, the plaintiff 
sought federal injunctive relief from the prospective application 
of a local ordinance banning topless dancing. Although the 
plaintiff asserted that he was threatened with possible 
prosecution under the statute, he had not, at the time he filed 
the injunction, in fact, had any charges filed against him. In 
Doran, the Court, after finding that the practical effect of 
injunctive relief and declaratory relief is identical, and 
stating: 
Moreover, neither declaratory nor injunctive relief 
can directly interfere with enforcement of contested 
statutes or ordinances except with respect to the 
particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free 
to prosecute others who may violate the statute, 
422 U.S. at 931, found that because the plaintiff had met the 
requirements for the issuance of an injunction, i.e., a showing of 
prospective personal irreparable injury and a likelihood of 
success on the merits, the issuance of the injunction by the 
federal court was proper. The court, after stating that the case 
was "a close one," found that since the plaintiffs had shown that 
absent preliminary relief they would suffer substantial economic 
harm through the application of the statute, an injunction was 
proper, even though the statute could possibly have been 
constitutionally applied to the plaintiffs. The Court expressly 
intimated "no view as to the ultimate merits of respondent's 
contentions." 422 U.S. at 916. 
In the instant case, the appellants are not seeking to 
prospectively enjoin, through federal process, the application of 
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a state statute which, in the future, may impact on them 
economically, as were the plaintiffs in Doran. Rather, the 
appellants here have been convicted and now seek, too late, to 
challenge on its face the statute which was constitutionally 
applied to them as it may be applied to third persons. This type 
of challenge, retrospective rather than prospective, challenging a 
conviction rather than applying for an injunction, and based on a 
possible application of a statute to third persons rather than the 
challengers, is not allowed under the Doran standards. In fact, 
the Doran court stated that even where an injunction had issued, 
state prosectuions could proceed against other potential 
defendants. 
Here, then, the appellants are too late to challenge 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended, on its face 
under Doran. For the appellants to have had standing to make such 
a challenge under Doran, an application for injunctive relief, 
coupled with a showing of prospective irreparable harm through 
prosecution and a likelihood of success on the merits, must have 
been made. Having failed tn follow these procedures specifically 
set out by the Supreme Court in Doran, the appellants cannot now 
twist the policies behind injunctive relief to apply retrospec-
tively once a prosecution has proceeded and a conviction properly 
obtained. Under Doran, the appellants have no standing to 
challenge the statute. 
The same policies which were controlling in Doran also 
preclude the appellants from challenging the statute at this 
-16-
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point on the basis of violation of the Utah State Constitution. 
While a challenge to the statute on that basis could have been 
brought under the Utah Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah 
Code Ann., § 78-33-1, et seq. (1953), as amended, upon a showing 
that the appellants' rights would be impaired by the contested 
legislation, this Court has indicated that such a challenge must 
be brought before an actual prosecution under the challenged 
statute has occurred. In Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 
(1978), this Court stated: 
A plaintiff may seek and obtain a declaration as to 
whether a statute is constitutional by averring in 
his pleading the grounds upon which he will be 
directly damaged in his person or property by its 
enforcement; by alleging facts indicating how he 
will be damaged by its enforcement; that defendant 
is enforcing such statute or has a duty or ability 
to enforce it; and the enforcement will impinge upon 
plaintiff's legal or constitutional rights. A 
complaint is insufficient which merely challenges 
the constitutionality of a statute, without in some 
way indicating that plaintiff will be affected by 
its operation or is subject to its terms and 
provisions. 
Id. at 716. 
Under Baird and Doran, the appellants are too late to 
petition for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended. Had the 
appellants been as concerned about the possible unconstitutional 
application of the statute to them or third persons at the time 
when they could properly have challenged the statute under either 
the Feaeral or State constitutions as they profess to be now, they 
could and should have brought the necessary actions in opposition 
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to the prospective application of the statute. Their attempt to 
petition this Court now for a sweeping declaratory ruling on the 
statute's constitutionality is too little too late. At this 
.... 
point, the appellants are without standing to raise those issues. 
Just as Doran and Baird prohibit the appellants from now 
raising a challenge based on prospective application of the 
statute to third persons, the recent case of New York v. Ferber, 
cited supra, leaves the appellants without standing to raise an 
"overbreadth" challenge as a defense after their convictions. 
In Ferber, the United States Supreme Court dealt 
directly with whether, after conviction, a defendant could raise 
the defense of the "First Amendment overbreadth" of a child 
pornography statute as it may be applied to third persons. The 
Court recognized the traditional rule that a person to whom a 
statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that 
statute on grounds that it may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3145 (see also: State v. Phillips, supra). While 
recognizing that what has come to be known as the "First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine" is one of the few exceptions to this general 
principle and must be justified by "weighty countervailing 
policies," United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), the Court 
stated that because the wide-reaching effects of striking a 
statute down on its face is "strong medicine" to be employed "only 
as a last resort," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 600 (1973), 
there must be a showing of "substantial overbreadth" before a 
statute will be invali~ated. 31 Cr.L.R. at 3145. 
-18-
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In Broadrick, the Court found that where conduct as well 
as speech is involved, a greater showing of "substantial 
overbreadth" must be made than where "pure speech" is involved, 
stating: 
.•. the plain import of our cases is, at the very 
least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an 
exception to our traditional rules of practice and 
that its function, a limited one at the outset, 
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior 
that it forbids the state to sanction moves from 
"pure speech" toward conduct, and that conduct--even 
if expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise 
valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state 
interest in maintaining comprehensive controls over 
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. 
Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter 
protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes 
a point where that ef fect--at best a 
prediction--cannot, with confidence, justify 
invalidating a statute on its face and so 
prohibiting a state from enforcing the statute 
against conduct that is admittedly within its power 
to proscribe [citation omitted]. To put the matter 
another way, particularly where conduct and not 
merely speech is involved, we believe that the 
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but 
substantial as well, judged in relation to the 
statute's plainly legitimate sweep. 
412 U.S. at 615. 
The Court then held that the Oklahoma Hatch Act statute 
challenged in Broadrick, which prohibited classified service 
employees from soliciting, receiving, or in any way being 
concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment or 
contribution for political organizations, candidacies, or other 
political purposes, as well as prohibition against an employee 
belonging to any national, state or local committee of a political 
party, was not "substantially overbroad" as it affected conduct as 
well as speech, stating: 
-19-
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It is our view that § 818 is not substantially 
overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist 
should be cured by case-by-case analysis of the fact 
situations to which its sanctions, assertively, may 
not be applied. 
Id. at 615-616. 
The Ferber Court, in finding that the New York child 
pornography law was not "substantially overbroad," recognized the 
principle enunciated in Broadrick and further stated: 
The premise that a law should not be invalidated for 
overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number 
of impermissible applications is hardly novel. On 
most occasions involving facial invalidation, the 
court has stressed the embracing sweep of the 
statute over protected expression. Indeed Justice 
Brennan observed in his dissenting opinion in 
Broadrick: 
"We have never held that a statute should be held 
invalid on its face merely because it is possible to 
conceive of a single impermissible application, and 
in that sense a requirement of substantial 
overbreadth is already implicit in the doctrine." 
413 U.S. at 630. 
The requirement of substantial overbreadth is 
directly derived from the purpose and nature of the 
doctrine. While a sweeping statute, or one 
incapable of limitation, has the potential to 
repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity 
by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of 
protected speech can be expected to decrease with 
the declining reach of the requlation. This 
observation appears equally applicable to the 
publication of books and films as it is to 
activities, such as picketing or participation in 
election campaigns, which have previouslv been 
categorized as involving conduct plus sp~ech. We 
see no appreciable difference between a publisher or 
bookseller in doubt as to the reach of New York's 
child pornography law and the situation faced by the 
Oklahoma State Employees with respect to that 
state's restrictions on partisan political activity. 
Indeed, it could be reasonably argued that the 
bookseller, with an economic incentive to sell 
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materials that may fall within the statute's scope, 
may be less likely to be deterred than the employee 
who wishes to engage in political campaign activity. 
Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
380-381 (1977) (overbreadth analysis inapplicable to 
commercial speech). 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3146. In the instant case, as was mentioned above, 
appellants' activities essentially amounted to conduct only. If 
any "speech" was involved, such speech deserves de minimus 
protection since it is coupled with conduct, and is thus, at most, 
within the "substantial overbreadth" standard enunciated in 
Broadrick and Ferber. While neither Broadrick nor Ferber gave a 
standardized test for determining "substantial overbreadth," it is 
worth noting that in both cases, the Court upheld the statutes in 
.question. In finding the New York statute, § 263.15, 
constitutional, the Court stated: 
[W]e consider this the paradigmatic case of a 
state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its 
arguably impermissible applications. New York, as 
we have held, may constitutionally prohibit 
dissemination of materials specified in§ 263.15. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3146. The Court expressed "serious doubt" that the 
arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more 
than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach, 
and further stated: 
[n]or will we assume that the New York courts will 
widen the possibly invalid reach of the statute by 
giving an expansive construction to the proscription 
on "lewd exhibition(s) of the genitals." 
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31 Cr.L.R. at 3146. Applying this logic to the instant case, this 
court should affirm the findings of the lower court that as 
applied to these appellants, the statute is not unconstitutionally 
.... 
overbroad, and that the arguably impermissible applications of the 
statute, exemplified by the "parade of horribles" referred to in 
the appellants' brief and exhibited in the appendix to their 
brief, do not amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials 
within the statute's reach, or that the courts will widen the 
possibly invalid reach of the statute by giving an expansive and 
unconstitutional construction to the language of the statute. 
Under the circumstances, Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-
1206.5 (1953), as amended, is "not substantially overbroad and 
whatever overbreadth exists should be cured through case-
by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions 
assertively may not be applied." Broadrick, supra, at 615-616~ 
Ferber, supra, 31 Cr.L.R. at 3146. Thus, even if the appellants 
could show that the activities of which they were convicted are 
entitled to First Amendment protections, because their actions 
involved conduct as well as speech, a showing of "substantial 
overbreadth" must be made. Since no "substantial overbreadth" has 
or can be shown by the appellants in their case, they are without 
standing to assert the "overbreadth" issue and should be precluded 
fr om raising the is sue on appeal. See also: H. L. v. Matheson, 
U.S. , 101 s.ct. 1164 (1981), and Parker v. Levy, 417 u.s. 
733 (1974). 
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POINT III 
UNDER NEW YORK V. FERBER, UTAH CODE ANN., 
§ 76-10-1206.5 (1953), AS AMENDED, AS APPLIED 
TO THESE APPELL.~NTS, IS NOT AN UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT OF FREE 
SPEECH OR EXPRESSION. 
As pointed out in Point I, the recent landmark decision 
of New York v. Ferber, U.S. , 31 Cr.L.R. 3139 (1982), 
definitively resolved the issue of what protection the 
dissemination of child pornography was to be given under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Assuming, arguenao, 
that the appellants had standing to raise the issues of free 
speech and expression under the First Amendment, Ferber's holding 
that no First Amendment protections extend to the distribution of 
child pornography render tne appellants' arguments without merit. 
In Ferber, a 9-0 Court specifically found five grounds 
for denying First Amendment protection to the distribution of 
child pornography. 
The Court first found that the State's interest in 
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of a 
minor" is "compelling." Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 
U.S. (1982), cited at 31 Cr.L.R. at 3142. The 
prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance. The 
Court held: 
The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment 
found in the relevant literature, is that the use of 
children as subjects of pornographic materials is 
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental 
health of the child. That judgment, we think, 
easily passes muster under the First Amendment. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3142. 
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The Court's second reason for its holding was that the 
standard previously set out in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973), that in order to find a work pornographic, it must, taken 
' 
as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest of the average person, 
"bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has been 
physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the 
work." 31 Cr.L.R. at 3143. Thus, because the distribution of 
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children, it is 
irrelevant to the determination of the overriding issue of the 
protection of children whether the material has a literary, 
artistic, political, or social value, and "we therefore cannot 
conclude that the Miller standard is a satisfactory solution to 
the child pornography problem." 31 Cr.L.R. at 3143. 
Third, the Court recognized that the production of child 
pornography is illegal throughout the nation, and that since the 
advertising and selling of child pornography provides an economic 
motive for that production, the First Amendment protections given 
the advertising are outweighed by the State's interest in 
protecting children. See Point I, supra. 
The fourth reason for uphol~ing Ferber's conviction was 
based upon the finding that the value of permitting live 
performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in 
lewd sexual conduct is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimus." 
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The Court stated: 
We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of 
children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting 
their genitals would often constitute an important 
and necessary part of a literary performance or 
scientific or education work. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3143. 
Fifth, the Court found that a recognition and 
classification of child pornography as a special category outside 
the protection of First Amendment protections is not incompatible 
with earlier decisions construing the First Amendment. In this 
regard, the Court stated: 
. . . It is not rare that a content-based 
classification of speech has been accepted because 
it may be appropriately generalized that within the 
confines of a given classification, the evil to be 
restricted to overwhelmingly outweighs the 
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no 
process of case-by-case adjudication is required. 
When a definable class of material, such as that 
covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and 
pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in 
its production, we think the balance of competing 
interests is clearly struck and that it is 
permissible to consider these materials as without 
the protection of the First Amendment. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3144. 
After setting forth these five criteria, the Court 
enunciated a new test governing child pornography cases, separate 
from the obscenity standard of Miller, stating: 
The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following 
respects: a trier of fact need not fino that the 
material appeals to the prurient interest of the 
average person; it is not required that sexual 
conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive 
manner; and the material at issue need not be 
considered as a whole. 
31 Cr.L.R. at 3144. 
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In the instant case, even assuming, arguendo, that the 
appellants' brief presented valid free speech issues to this 
Court, both the rationale and the holding of the Ferber case 
" 
render the appellants' points without merit. 
Here, the state's interest in protecting minors is at 
least as compelling as was that of New York in passing the 
legislation upheld in Ferber. In fact, the appellants recognize 
that the legislative purpose behind the Utah statute, as well as 
other state statutes dealing with child pornography, is "to 
prohibit the use of minors in pornographic photographs and films" 
(see appellants' brief, page 5). Such is a valid state purpose. 
Here, also, as in Ferber, analysis of the child pornography 
problem is not adequately handled under the Miller standard (see 
Point I of this brief). Since the purpose of the statute at issue 
here is to prohibit the abuse of children, the issue of the 
resulting work's literary, artistic, or social value is, if an 
issue at all, to be weighed in light of the statute's purpose. 
As mentioned supra, this case involves the production 
rather than the distribution of child pornography. Even were 
production of child pornography to be seen as holding the same 
free speech protection of distribution, no First Amendment 
protection can be found for such activity since any free speech 
protections are outweighed by the State's interest in protecting 
children. 
Here, as well, the value of producing child pornography 
through the sexual exploitation of a minor is "exceedingly modest, 
if not de minimus." It can hardly be argued that the photographs 
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entered into evidence in the appellants' trial constitute an 
important ana necessary part of a literary performance or a 
scientific or educational work (see Exhibits 1-30). 
Given these facts, coupled with the United States 
Supreme Court's determination that child pornography falls without 
the pale of First Amendment protection, it cannot be asserted that 
the trial court's finding of guilt deprived the appellants of free 
speech protection, either under the United States Constitution or 
under the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain 
the freedom of speech or of the press. 
For the same reasons underlying the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Ferber that child pornography is not protected under 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, this Court 
should find that the Utah Constitution, the provisions of which 
closely parallel those of the United States Constitution, does not 
include child pornography within its protective ambit. 
The Supreme Court's adjustment in Ferber of the 
formulation of the Miller standard as regards child pornography 
renders the cases relied upon by the appellants--Roth v. United 
States, 344 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller, ci tea supra; and Rome Box 
Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, Civil No. C-81-0331J (D.C. Utah 19 82) 
inapplicable in this case, even were this case to be seen as one 
involving free speech issues. Strict adherence to the 
requirements that materials appeal to the prurient interest, 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and as 
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a whole offend community standards is, under Ferber, not required. 
Those cases cited by the appellant which hold to the contrary are 
old law, ann irrelevant within the context of this case. 
\ 
Under Ferber, then, the First Amendment issues raised by 
the appellants are meri tles s, and the appellants' cause based on 
free speech issues should be rejected. 
POINT IV 
SINCE NEITHER THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOR FAMILY 
RIGHTS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, THE 
APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CHALLENGE 
UTAH CODE ANN.,§ 76-10-1206.5 ON THOSE 
GROUNDS. 
In Point II of their brief, the appellants have raised 
the defense of a right of privacy, citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557 (1969), arguing that because "a state has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may 
read or what films he may watch," 394 U.S. at 565, the acts of the 
appellants constituting the production of child pornography are 
protected. Such an argument is patently illogical. In the 
instant case, there was no issue raised as to the appellants' 
right to read, watch, or observe sexually explicit materials, the 
central issue in Stanley. Here, as has been previously mentioned 
and has been recognizec1 by the appellants, the purpose behind the 
child pornography statute in question goes beyond the acts of an· 
adult in the privacy of his own home. It extends to the 
prohibition, within the state's police power, of the employment or 
use of a child to engage in activities from which the State has 
validly chosen to protect him. In view of this State goal, the 
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appellants' right of privacy, like First Amendment rights, if any 
be extant, must be weighed in the balance of competing policies 
and factors. See Ferber, supra, at 3134. 
The appellants' attempt to assert the minor's right of 
privacy as a shield for the appellants (see appellants' brief, 
page 21) is misplaced in any case. While it may be true that a 
minor is protected, under a right of privacy, to view obscene 
materials, under the Stanley doctrine (although under Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), this is not clear), and are, as 
asserted by the appellants, entitled to limited guarantees of free 
speech, the minor's rights cannot be asserted by third parties 
charged with employing, using, or enticing that minor for criminal 
purposes. 
It is ironic that the appellants, by whose conduct the 
minor's privacy was in a real sense violated, should rely on a 
defense of an unwarranted governmental intrusion into their 
privacy by prosecution under the child pornography statute. In 
essence the appellants are asserting a right of privacy to shield 
them in violating another person's privacy. Such an assertion is, 
at best, puzzling. 
Equally baffling is the appellants' argument, raised for 
the first time on appeal, that Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10~1206.5 
interferes with the relationship of a parent to his child. As a 
general rule, this Court will not consider an issue for the first 
time on appeal. State v. Hales, Utah, No. 18083, decided July 7, 
1982; State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 84~ (1972); 
State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 408 P.2d 912 (1965). 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that there were no problems with raising 
this issue for the first time on appeal, the appellants have no 
standing to raise the "family rights" argument. Here, neither of 
the appellants was related in any way to the minor, nor were they 
related legally to each other, despite the fact that they were 
apparently cohabitating (see appellants' brief, page 2). It is 
interesting to note that the minor's mother, who testified against 
the appellants, indicated that if the relationship between parent 
and child had in this case been interfered with, it had been done 
by the appellants (R. 143-146). For this reason, coupled with the 
fact that the appellants have no standing to raise the "family 
rights" issue as regards third persons for the reasons enunciated 
in the "overbreadth" and "vagueness" arguments above, the 
appellants' arguments regarding "family rights" are without merit 
and should not be countenanced. 
POINT V 
UT~9 CODE AN~., § 76-10-1206.5 (1953), AS 
AMENDED, IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
In Point III of their brief, the appellants argue that 
since there is no statutory definition of "simulated sexual 
conduct," which is proscribed by statute and is charged in the 
information against the appellants, a defense that the statute is 
void for vagueness applies. 
Under current standards, a law is not unconstituionally 
vague unless it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
reasonable opportunity to know what the statute proscribes. 
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Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156 {1972). 
The courts have recognized that where commonsense 
understanding reveals the general nature of the conduct 
prohibited, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not mandate complete certainty about the meaning of statutory 
terms. Thus, in a recent case, the Colorado Supreme Court held 
that: 
Where fairness can be achieved by a commonsense 
reading of the statute, we will not adopt a 
bypertechnical construction to invalidate the 
provision. 
People v. Garcia, Colo., 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979). See also: 
State v. Randolph, Kan., 597 P.2d 672 (1979). In Boyce Motor 
Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952), the Supreme Court of 
the United States wrote: 
. [F]ew words possess the precision of 
mathematical symbols. Most statutes must deal with 
untold and unforeseen variations in factual 
situations, and the practical necessities of 
government inevitably limit the specificity with 
which legislators can spell out prohibitions. 
Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of 
certaintv can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to 
require ihat one who deliberately goes perilously 
close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take 
the risk that he may cross the line. 
342 U.S. 337, 340. 
This Court has also recognized the principle in State v. 
Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). The Court there 
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stated: 
The limitations of language are such that neither 
absolute exactitude nor complete precision of 
meaning are to be expected, and such standard cannot 
be required. 
250 P.2d 561, 564. Respondent submits that the phrase "simulated 
sexual conduct" is sufficiently precise to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence notice that the type of conduct in which 
appellants engaged is prohibited. The term "sexual conduct" is 
precisely defined in Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-10-1201(7): 
"Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual 
intercourse, or any touching of a person's clothes 
or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if 
the person is a female, breast, whether alone or 
between members of the same or opposite sex or 
between humans and animals in an act of apparent or 
actual sexual stimulation or gratification. 
Contrary to the appellants' assertion, the definition entails acts 
that can be performed by one person. In fact, it can hardly be 
envisioned that a person of ordinary, common intelligence would 
not, based upon the definition of "sexual conduct" and the 
explicit prohibitions of Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5 (1953}, as 
amended, be able to discern what type of activity is statutorily 
proscribed, simply because a precise definition of "simulated" is 
not given in the statute. 
The respondent submits that in the absence of a 
statutory definition, the word "simulated" should be given its 
dictionary meaning. For example, Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1973), gives as the definition of "simulate": 
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To copy, represent, feign, 
1: to assume the outward qualities or appearance 
of, usu. with the intent to deceive. 
It 'Should be pointea out that since the term "simulate" is not a 
legal term, reference to stanaard works of common usage, such as 
the aictionary, is appropriate. This common aefinition of 
"simulate" is a far cry from the appellants' seemingly intentional 
twisting of the definition to mean "almost." It strains the 
imagination to believe that the appellants were so ignorant of the 
common usage of common phrases proscribing their behavior that 
they aid not know it was illegal. 
In dealing with a similar challenge to statutory 
language the United States Supreme Court, in Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 600 (1973), discussea supra, founa that 
Oklahoma's Hatch Act, which did not include definitions of the 
terms "airect or inairect contribution," was not void for 
vagueness. The court recognizea that the appellants in that case 
had conceded that the state's purpose in enacting the act was 
proper, but contended that: 
.. [i)ts language is unconstitutionally vague and 
its prohibitions too broad in their swee~, failing 
to distinguish between conduct that may be 
proscribed ana conduct that must be permitte0. 
413 U.S. at 608. The Court responded by saying that: 
We have little aoubt that § 818 is ... not so 
vague that "men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning" . . . [cites 
omitted] ... Whatever other problems there are 
with § 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that 
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the section fails to give adequate warning of what 
activities it proscribes or fails to set out 
"explicit standards" for those who must apply it 
. In the plainest language it prohibits any 
state classified employee from being "an officer or 
member" of a partisan political club" or a candidate 
for "any paid public office." It forbids 
solicitation of contributions "for any political 
organization, candidacy or other political 
organization, candidacy or other political purpose" 
and taking part "in the management or affairs of any 
political party or in any political campaign." 
Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, 
as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over 
the meaning of such terms in § 818 as "part is an," or 
"take part in," or "affairs of" political parties. 
But what was said in Letter Carriers, supra, 413 
U.S., at 578-579, 93 S.Ct., at 3897, is applicable 
here: "There are limitations in the English 
language with respect to being both specific and 
manageably brief, and it seems to us that although 
the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on 
finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms 
that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common 
sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, 
without sacrifice to the public interest." 
Id. at 607-608 (Emphasis in original). 
The instant matter is very similar to that presented to 
the Court in Broadrick. Here, as has been previously pointed out, 
the appellants recognize the valid state purpose behind the 
stat~tory prohibition of sexual exploitation of a minor. Here, as 
in Broadrick, the fact that words of common everyday use are not 
statutorily defined is used as a subterfuge to avoid punishment 
under the statute. It cannot be asserted, however, based on the 
evidence and the exhibits in this case, that the appellants could 
not sufficiently understand the statute and comply with its 
requirements because of a misunderstanding of the word 
" s i mu 1 a tea . " see Sa 1 t Lake C i t y v . Piepenburg , u t ah , 5 7 1 P . 2 a 
1299 (1977). In fact, although the appellants were not charged 
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with using Holly Wilkerson to engage in "actual," rather than 
"simulated," sexual conduct, it appears from the exhibits in this 
cas€ that such a charge could have been properly made. 
It is interesting to note that the appellants apparently 
accept the federal statute, 18 u.s.c. § 2252 as sufficiently 
specific (see appellants' brief, page 14), although that statute 
defines "sexually explicit conduct" as "actual or simulated" acts, 
without a statutory definition of "simulated." The constitu-
tionality of 18 u.s.c. § 2251 also seems to have been impliedly 
accepted by the United States Supreme Court in Ferber. See 31 
Cr.L.R. at 3143, fn. 15. 
Because the appellants' activities clearly fall within 
the "hard core of the statute's proscriptions," Broadrick, supra, 
at 609, the appellants are without standing to challenge the 
statute on the basis of vagueness. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733, 756: 
[O]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may 
not successfully challenge it for vagueness. 
Thus, the appellants' resurrect ion of a "parade of horribles" for 
the second time in their brief, in the context of a distorted 
hypothesis of the meaning of the word "simulated," proposed by the 
appellants to mean "almost," should not be seen as raising any 
valid issues. The exhibits in this case indicate that the 
appellants were not concerned with how closely or far apart from 
the victim's nude body they could get before "almost touching," as 
their brief would indicate. Such arcane semantical distinctions 
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are simply not at issue in this case, in which a finding of use of 
the victim to simulate sexual conduct was justified and 
appropriate. If, as the appellants assert, there is an "apparent 
difficulty in using a 'common sense' approach to the meaning" of 
the word "simulated," such a difficulty appears to be found only 
with the appellants {see appellants' brief, page 27). Common 
sense would indicate to the ordinary person that the appellants' 
actions were illegal. The appellants' actions being within the 
"hard core of the statute's proscriptions" precludes the 
appellants from having standing to raise "vagueness" as a 
defense. 
In asserting, without follow-up, that the state's 
position in this case appears to be that nudity without more is a 
sufficient violation of the law to justify conviction, the 
appellants unnecessarily obscure the "vagueness" issue, confusing 
it with that of "overbreadth," treated supra. As has been 
previously pointed out, the appellants were not charged solely 
with using the victim to pose in the nude, nor were the 
appellants' convictions based on such a finding. The appellants' 
attempt to raise the "nudity without more" issue under the rubrik 
of vagueness is illogical and unwarranted. Since the appellants 
were neither chargea nor convicted under such a standard, they 
have no standing to raise it under any theory. See State v. 
Phillips, supra. 
If the appellants' point in raising the "nudity" issue 
is to show statutory vagueness in the definition of "nudity," 
although that is by no means clear in their argument, it should be 
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pointed out that "nudity" is specifically defined statutorily in 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1201(6): 
"Nudity" means the showing of the human male or 
, female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less 
than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female 
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any 
portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the 
depiction of covered male genitals in a discernablv 
turgid state. _, 
The appellants neither have nor can assert, based on either a 
statutory or "common sense" definition, that at the time of the 
crime they did not know their conduct was illegal because they 
could not understand the meaning of the word "nudity." The 
definition is not vague. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
SEAR CH WARRANT. 
In Point IV of their brief, the appellants raise two 
issues regarding the adequacy of the affidavit upon which the 
search· warrant was issued. First, the appellants assert that 
because Officer Stewart Winn of the Orem Police Department, the 
affiant, did not personally view the materials to be seized under 
the warrant, but relied upon information from a confidential 
informant, the warrant was fatally defective. Second, the 
appellants state that there was a lack of sufficient specificity 
i~ the affidavit to allow the magistrate to "searchingly focus" 6n 
the First Amendment issue of obscenity as required under Lee Art 
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1969), Utah Code Ann., § 
76-10-1212(1), and State v. Piepenburg, Utah, 602 P.2d 702 (1979). 
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It should be noted at the outset that both of the 
appellants' arguments were presented to the court below at a 
suppression hearing, and were found to be without merit (R. 
85-92). The finding of the trial court should be considered by 
this Court in a light most favorable to the State. State v. 
Mccardell, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 17718 (decided August 27, 
1982). 
Under the standards set forth in the United States 
Supreme Court cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and 
Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969), there is no 
requirement that an af fiant personally view the material to be 
seized where information relied on comes from a confidential 
informant. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, where information 
from an informant is relied upon in the issuance of a warrant, the 
warrant is valid if the information received from the informant 
can be shown to be reliable. This is done by the satisfaction of 
what has been characterized as a "two-prong test." Under the 
first prong, it must be shown that the informant had a "basis of 
knowledge" for the information given the affiant. The second 
requirement of Aguilar-Spinelli is that underlying facts be given 
the magistrate from which he could conclude that the informant 
himself was reliable. This has ~en characterized as the 
"veracity" prong of Aguilar-Spinelli. See Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. at 416, and LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (1978), § 3.3, Information from 
an Informant. In the present case, both prongs of the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test were fully satisfied. There has never been 
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a constitutional requirement that the affiant actually see the 
materials to be seized, regardless of the appellants' assertions 
to the contrary. Rather, as in Spinelli, an officer-affiant is 
'\ 
justified in relying upon the representations made by ~n informant 
where the informant's reliability can be shown. See State v. 
Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972). In fact, the 
"basis of knowledge" prong of Spinelli may be satisfied by 
relating credible hearsay which indicates that the confidential 
informant has observed firsthand or has reason to believe, based 
again on credible hearsay, the facts to which he has attested to 
the af fiant. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 425 
{concurring opinion by White, J.). See also: United States v. 
Freeman, 532 F.2d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 1976), and State v. Yaw, 
Hawaii, 572 P.2d 856 (1977). 
Despite the appellants' argument that the information in 
the affidavit is insufficiently detailed and is based solely on 
conclusory assertions, the evidence indicates that the information 
contained in the affidavit was sufficiently detailed and 
indicative of the informant's "basis of knowledge" as to have 
justified the issuance of the warrant. The affidavit specifically 
stated: 
Confidential informant "Gorgo" visited Robert 1Jordan 
at 7 54 South 5 0 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah, on 
November 1, 1981. Terry Fullmer offered to sell 
"Gorgo" some stolen unexposed film. "Gorgo" asked 
what they used the film for. They then showed him a 
stack of approximately 50 Polaroid snapshots. They 
all showed Holly Wilkerson, Terry Fullmer, and 
Robe rt Jordan engaging in, or simulating sex acts. 
"Gorgo" describes Holly as approximately 15 years 
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old, tall and redheaded. That matches the physical 
description of the runaway Holly Wilkerson. "Gorgo" 
was told that they intend to sell the photographs to 
"Penthouse Magazine." 
(R. 4). The fact that the informant had personally seen the 
Polaroid snapshots, had described a victim as "approximately 15 
years old, tall, and redheaded," which description matched that of 
the victim, Holly Wilkerson, and set out in detail the 
circumstances under which he became aware of the information which 
was relayed in the affidavit indicates a sufficient "basis of 
knowledge" on the informant's part to indicate the reliability of 
the information given. 
The "veracity" prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test was 
·satisfied in the officer-affiant's recitation that the informant 
"has proven reliable in the past assisting this department in 
numerous narcotic operations now pending prosecution" (R. 4). 
Under Spinelli, this description is sufficiently detailed, going 
beyond a mere conclusory allegation that the informant is 
"reliable." See also: McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); 
United States v .. Freeman, supra. In the instant case, then, the 
informant's "basis of knowledge" and "veracity" were shown in the 
affidavit, satisfying both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 
The appellants' second argument, that the affidavit was 
insufficiently detailed to allow the magistrate to "searchingly 
focus" on the issue of obscenity to establish probable cause for 
issuance of the warrant, as required by State v. Piepenburg, cited 
supra, is also meritless. 
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Notwithstanding the appellants' attempt to assert the 
claim that this case deals with First Amendment issues, it should 
once again be pointed out that the central issue in this case is 
~ 
the abuse and exploitation of children through use of minors to 
pose in the nude for the sexual arousal of any person (see Point I 
of this brief; New York v. Ferber, supra). Thus, Piepenburg's 
arguably more stringent standards for issuance of a warrant where 
First Amendment issues are present are inapplicable. In this 
case, as in any case where First Amendment issues are not present, 
the standard for the establishment of probable cause is a 
requirement of sufficient information to indicate that criminal 
activity has occurred and that evidence of that criminal activity 
will be found at the place to be searched. Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under that 
standard, the affidavit underlying the search warrant was 
sufficient. Here, the detailed affidavit gave information from 
which a reasonable magistrate could conclude that sexual 
exploitation of a minor had occurred, and that evidence of such 
would be found at the appellants' residence. Under the accepted 
Fourth Amendment standards for issuance of a search warrant, there 
was no defect in the issuance of the warrant. 
Alternatively, even if this case were analyzed within 
the context of a First Amendment free speech case, the affidavit 
here was sufficiently detailed to pass muster under Lee Art 
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(1) 
(1953), as amended, and State v. Piepenburg, supra. 
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The appellants' reliance on Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. 
Virginia, supra, is misplaced. There the United States Supreme 
Court found insufficient the procedure followed by a justice of 
the peace which allowed a search warrant to issue upon a police 
officer's affidavit which stated the conclusory allegations that a 
film sought to be seized was "obscene." The court found this 
pro~dure did not allow the magistrate to "focus searchingly on 
the question of obscenity," a standard the Court had previously 
set out in Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East 
Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717 (1961). If the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 76-10-1212(1} (1953), as amended, are complied with, a 
challenge under Lee Art Theatre cannot stana, the procedure found 
objectionable by the United States Supreme Court being fully 
avoided. In the instant case, the requirements of Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-10-1212(1) {1953), as amended, were fully met. That Section 
provides: 
(1) An affidavit for search warrant shall be filed 
with the Magistrate describing with specificity the 
material sought to be seized. Where practical, the 
material alleged to be pornographic shall be 
attached to the affidavit for search warrant so as 
to affor~ the Magistrate the opportunity to examine 
this material. 
The appellants correctly cite the holding of Piepenburg, supra, 
that where the affiant's affidavit is sufficiently detailed it is 
not necessary that the magistrate personally view the material to 
be seized. Rather, the court stated that where the affidavit 
gives sufficient information to allow the magistrate to 
searchingly focus on the issue of obscenity, the issuance of the 
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warrant will be upheld. The respondent submits that the affidavit 
in the instant case met the standara set forth in Piepenburg and 
Lee Art Theatre. The Piepenburg court, in adopting the standara 
that required that the magistrate be able to "focus searchingly on 
the question of obscenity," specifically referred to the Oklahoma 
case of State v. Conaughty, Okl. Cr., 561 P.2d 554 (1977), in 
which that Court of Criminal Appeals held that an affidavit which 
specified that a film viewed by the affiant was a "lewd and 
obscene film" was insufficient. The Oklahoma court held that: 
A magistrate may find probable cause to issue a 
warrant when an af fiant views a film and in his 
affidavit or attendant testimony he factually 
describes the film in detail [citations omitted]. 
The affidavit must simply allow the magistrate an 
opportunity to "focus searchingly on the question of 
obscenity" [citations omitted]. 
561 P.2d at 555 (emphasis added). 
Sufficient detail is found in the affidavit at issue in 
this case. Here the affiant relates information from the 
informant that is both factual and detailed, i.e., that the 
approximately 50 Polaroid snapshots shown him by the appellants 
"showed Holly Wilkerson, Terry Fullmer, and Robert Jordan engaging 
in, or simulating, sex acts" (R. 4). The affidavit goes on to 
describe Holly Wilkerson's physical appearance, "approximately 15 
years old, tall and redheaded." The description and detail are 
far from an objectionable, conclusory statement that the photos 
were "obscene," such as that in Conaughty. 
For all the legal standards set forth in the cases 
regarding sufficient detail to withstand a challenge to the 
-43-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
probable cause underlying the issuance of an affidavit, the 
finding of sufficiency in this case is basically one of fact, one 
that was resolvea in the State's favor in the court below. The 
detail given in the affidavit from Officer Winn indicates that 
even if this case were viewed as coming within the context of the 
First Amendment, which it does not, such a finding was justified. 
POINT VII 
THE SEARCH WARRANT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED THE 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED. 
In Point V of their brief, the appellants assert two 
arguments. First, because the warrant itself was not sufficiently 
specific in its description of the items to be seized, the 
evidence taken under the warrant should have been suppressed. 
Second, because unexposed film, a cloth sack and a television set 
were seized, the broad execution of the warrant somehow rendered 
the warrant's issuance invalid. 
The affidavit underlying the search warrant, which gave 
the magistrate sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant (See 
Point VI, supra), indicated that the affiant was aware that his 
confidential informant, "Gorgo," had been shown a stack of 
approximately 50 Polaroid snapshots depicting Holly Wilkerson, 
Terry Fullmer, and Robert Jordan engaging in or simulating sex 
acts (R. 4, See Appendix "A"). Based upon this probable cause 
finding by the magistrate, a search warrant was issued which 
directed an immediate search of appellants' residence: 
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For the ~resence therein of child pornography, and 
other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor. 
(R. 6, See Appendix "B"). The search was carried out on November 
3, f981, the same day the warrant was issued (R. 81, 6), and 
several items of property were taken from the appellants' 
residence. The inventory of property lists the following: 
1. Assorted instant photographs, 
2. Unexposed 35-MM film, 
3. Flash Cubes, 
4. Cloth Sack, 
5. Unexposed Polaroid Film, 
6. General Electric Color Television Set. 
( R • 5 , A p pe nd i x " C " ) . 
The appellants first argue that because the magistrate 
authorized the seizure of "child pornography and other evidence of 
sexual exploitation of a minor," without a specific definition of 
"child pornography," this case is brought within the ruling of 
Marcus v. Search Warrants, Propertv at 104 East Tenth Street, 
-Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). In so arguing, the 
appellants once again muddy the issues by implying that First 
Amendment issues of "obscenity" and "pornography," free speech and 
free expression are involved. Such is simply not the case (See 
Point I, supra). 
The magistrate's unfortunate use of the term "child 
pornography," which is understandable in light of the pre-Ferber 
interpretations of sexual exploitation statutes (See Point I, 
supra), may, at first blush, be seen as invoking judgments by the 
police that would have First Amendment implications. Even though 
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the magistrate's use of the term "child pornography" was included 
within and considered by the magistrate to be a part of the larger 
concept of "sexual exploitation of a minor," resort to First 
Amendment considerations is still inappropriate. The magistrate's 
direction to search "for the presence of child pornography, and 
other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor" plainly 
indicates the magistrate's intention that the search was to be 
conducted primarily for any evidence of sexual exploitation of a 
minor, regardless of whether such evidence was legally obscene or 
not. This direction is permissible and sufficient. 
Evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor may or may 
not be considered legally obscene (See Point VIII of this brief). 
Thus, where the police are directed to search for evidence of 
sexual exploitation of a minor, as in the instant case, the 
officers' focus in carrying out the search is not in determining 
whether evidence of sexual exploitation is obscene, which 
determination is arguably proscribed under Marcus, supra, but 
rather is whether such evidence is relevant to the determination 
of whether the crime alleged has been committed. The 
constitutional safeguards which due process demands in an 
obscenity case, which assure that non-obscene material is not kept 
from distribution, would be erroneously applied where they are 
invoked solely to keep relevant non-obscene evidence from seizure 
where obscenity is not at issue. Nor is Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., v. New 
York, 442 D.S. 319 (1979), cited by the appellants, controlling. 
Not only di~ that case deal with First Amendment issues, hut the 
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holding was based on the insufficiency of the underlying affidavit 
for the search warrant, as well as the sufficiency of an "open-
ended" search warrant which was to be completed only after the 
magistrate himself helped to carry out the search. In the instant 
case, none of the objectionable factors in Lo-Ji Sales is present 
here. Here, the affidavit underlying the warrant was sufficient 
(See Point VI, supra), the warrant was not open-ended or to be 
completed by the issuing magistrate, nor did the magistrate help 
to carry out the search authorized by the warrant. The 
appellants' reliance on the language of the case is misplaced in 
light of the fact that none of the factors leading to the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in that case is present here. 
Where there is no issue of First Amendment protections 
for obscenity, or free speech, but rather where child abuse is at 
issue, the fact that the executing officers were authorized to 
determine whether evidence seized was evidence of child abuse, was 
not objectionable. The search warrant was sufficiently specific 
under Fourth Amendment requirements. 
In determining whether the objects of a search were 
adequately described in a search warrant, the test is one of 
reasonableness, and elaborate specificity is not required. United 
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); United States v. 
Freeman, 532 F.2d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 1976). The degree of 
specificity required when describing goods to be seized may 
necessarily vary according to the circumstances and type of items 
involved. United States v. Davis, 542 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1976), 
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cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976). Courts have upheld as 
sufficiently specific search warrants which authorize the seizure 
of "paraphernalia for making coins," United States v. Wilson, 451 
F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied; Fairman v. United States, 
405 U.S. 1032 (1971), "cooking utensils," State v. Walker, 202 
Kan. 475, 449 P.2d 515 (1969), "various instruments and tools used 
i n pe rf o rm i nq an abort ion, " state v . Brown , Kan. , 4 7 0 P. 2 d 815 
(1970), "narcotics, dangerous drugs, and narcotic paraphernalia," 
People v. Henry, Colo., 482 P.2d 357 (1971), and "any item in five 
separate places relating to the death of an unknown individual 
whose body had been found at described location," State v. 
Ferrari, 80 N.M. 714, 460 P.2d 244 (1969). 
Where, as here, the crime suspected involves child 
abuse, it has been held that the specificity requirements of a 
search warrant, while they must comport with Fourth Amendment 
standards, are somewhat less stringent than where other 
considerations are involved. In State v. Massev, Ore. App., 594 
P.2d 1274 (1979), the court upheld a search warrant which 
authorized a search "for evidence of the crimes of child abuse 
and/or failure to send and maintain child at school." The court 
stated: 
Here, there was a strong probability that a crime 
involving danger to human life was underway and that 
imminent action to prevent harm to human life was 
warranted. The means of committing that harm, 
however, could not be known in advance of the 
search. In such a case, a general description with 
a limitation is a reasonable way to proceed. See 
State v. Tidvman, 30 Ore. App. 537, 568 P.2d 666 
review denied (1977). The description in this 
warrant, although broad, was sufficient to direct 
the officers to search for the child and to limit 
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their search to places and items relating to the 
child. The search for the child did not exceed that 
purpose or that limitation. We ao not recommend the 
wrrant as a model of description but we hold it to 
be constitutionally sufficient. 
Id. at 1276. 
In the instant case, while the affidavit underlying the 
search warrant did not indicate that a crime involving danger to 
human life was under way, there was sufficient indication that a 
crime involving aanger to a minor's psychological well being, a 
state interest which the Ferber court found to be as compelling as 
the physical well being of a minor, 31 Cr.L.R. at 3142, was 
underway. Thus, using the Massey standards, the nature of the 
crime itself rendered the warrant's specificity sufficient. 
Certainly a warrant which authorizes the seizure of "child 
pornography, and other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor" 
is as specific as that warrant in Massey which authorized a search 
"for evidence of the crimes of child abuse, and/or failure to send 
and maintain child at school." Given the circumstances of this 
case, the trial court's determination that the search warrant was 
sufficiently specific was not error. 
The appellants' second argument, that the broad 
execution of the warrant rendered the warrant's issuance invalid, 
constitutes "bootstrapping" and is without merit. Despite the 
appellants' assertion that: 
it is difficult to imagine what relevance unexposed 
film, a cloth sack and a television set would have 
to do with child pornography or evidence of sexual 
exploitation of a minor, 
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and that "the seizure of 265 photographs, the majority of which do 
not picture the minor at all, would appear to exceed even the 
broad discretion set forth in the warrant" (see appellants' brief, 
page 32), there are several theories under which the police could 
validly seize those items, none of which would render the 
warrant's issuance invalid. It is probable that in seizing the 
unexposed Polaroid film, the 35-mrn film, the cloth sack and the 
television set, the police wer~ validly exercising their 
discretion within the "plain view" doctrine. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 
234 (1968); Recznik v. Loraine, 393 U.S. 166 (1968). It is 
possible that the police seized the items as "mere evidence" of 
the crime. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). In either case, 
seizure of the evidence would not mandate its suppression nor 
render a sufficiently specific warrant invalid. In the instant 
case, however, regardless of the theory under which the items were 
seized, the appellants have no grounds for complaint since none of 
the items seized, with the exception of 30 photographs, was 
introduced into evidence. 
The appellants' arqumen~ that the broad execution of a 
warrant renders the warrant's issuance invalid is not supported by 
case law. In fact, the appellants' implied argument that they 
were somehow harmed in their trial by the seizure of evidence 
which was never introduced against them falls of its own weight. 
An argument that the broad execution of the ~arrant is 
indicative that the warrant itself was not sufficiently particular 
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must also fail here. While the rule in determining a warrant's 
specificity is that the warrant's validity must be determined 
without reference to actions taken under the warrant, it should be 
pointed out that even if references to a warrant's execution were 
permitted in determining the validity of the warrant's issuance, 
the appellants in this case have conceded that the execution of 
the warrant, through seizure of 265 photographs, appears to exceed 
the discretion set forth in the warrant (See appellants' brief, p. 
32). Here, then, even were reference to a warrant's execution 
allowed in determining the validity of a warrant's issuance, the 
appellants have indicated that in the instant case such reference 
is inappropriate. 
Here, the search warrant was sufficiently specific to 
pass muster under the constitutional requirements for search 
warrants. The trial court's ruling to that effect was not error. 
POINT VIII 
SINCE UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-10-1212(3) IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, THERE WAS NO 
ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT CARRYING OUT 
ITS REQUIREMENTS. 
The appellants argue, in Point VI of their brief, that 
error arose in the trial court's noncompliance with the provisions 
of Ut~ Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(3), which provides: 
(3) In the event that a search warrant is issued and 
material alleged to be pornographic is seizea under 
the orovisions of this section, any person claiming 
to b~ in possession of this material or claiming 
ownership of it at the time of its seizure may file 
a notice in writing with the magistrate within 10 
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days after the date of the seizure, alleging that 
the material is not pornographic. The magistrate 
shall set a hearing within seven days after the 
filing of this notice, or at such other time as the 
claimant might agree. At this hearing evidence may 
be presented as to whether there is prohable cause 
to believe the material seized is pornographic, and 
at the conclusion of the hearing the magistrate 
shall make a further determination of whether 
probable cause exists to believe that the material 
is pornographic. A decision as to whether there is 
probable cause to believe the seized material is 
pornographic shall be rendered by the court within 
two days after the conclusion of the hearing. If at 
the hearing the magistrate finds that no probable 
cause exists to believe that the material is 
pornographic, then the material shall be returned to 
the person or persons from whom it was seized. If 
the material seized is a film, and the claimant 
demonstrates that no other copy of the film is 
available to him, the court shall allow the film to 
be copied at the claimant's expense pending the 
hearing. 
Notice of Claim that the Material Seized is Not Pornographic on 
November 9, 1981 (R. 7), six days after the search of his 
residence was carried out. Other than the trial, no hearing to 
decide whether the material was in fact pornographic was held. It 
is respondent's position that because First Amendment issues of 
obscenitv and pornography are not applicable in determining the 
appellants' guilt, compliance with the statute cited above to 
determine whether the material seized was pornographic is 
unnecessary and inappropriate. 
As was pointed out in the appellants' brief, the Utah 
statute at issue was provided for by the Legislature in order that 
the requirements set out in the United States Supreme Court case 
of Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973), be complied with. In 
Heller, the Supreme Court helo that where a prompt adversary 
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hearing is afforded a defendant charged with obscenity violations 
after seizure of allegedly obscene materials, no "prior restraint" 
which violated the defendant's rights had occurred. The court did 
indicate, however, that in order to insure that non-o~scene 
materials were not restricted, a hearing on whether material 
seized is pornographic should be held promptly after the seizure 
if such had not been held prior to the seizure. Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-10-1212(3) is a direct response, on the state level, to that 
constitutionally mandated requirement of a prompt adversary 
hearing enunciated in Heller. 
The instant case is easily distinguishahle from the 
Heller-type case which requires a hearing either before or 
promptly after a seizure of material. Where Heller dealt directly 
with the violation of obscenity laws 1 the crime involved in this 
case is the sexual abuse of minors, a crime unrelated to 
-obscenity. Where the purpose of the hearing requirements of 
Heller, and the resulting Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(3), are to 
protect free speech and expression rights, no such purpose need or 
can be served he re. 
The necessity of aahering to a statute's requirements 
must be seen in light of the statute's purpose and design. 
Guinyard v. State, S.C., 195 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1973). Where a 
statute is inapplicable, or the purpose of the statute would not 
be served by slavish adherence to its requirements, there is no 
error in ignoring the statute's directions. Such is the case 
here. 
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A judicial determination of whether the material seized 
is pornographic would not resolve the issue of a defendant's guilt 
of sexual exploitation, nor would it serve any other purpose. If 
the photographs were seized under a valid warrant, and were 
otherwise admissible into evidence, there would have been no error 
in so admitting them whether the evidence was obscene or not. 
Thus, even if the evidence were found to be non-pornographic 
through a hearing held under Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(3), if 
the evidence were otherwise relevant to determining the ultimate 
issue of guilt, it could be used at trial. 
Here, the question of whether the evidence of sexual 
exploitation of a minor is pornographic bears no more relevance to 
a determination of the guilt or innocence of the appellants than 
would a question of whether evidence of a robbery or rape is 
pornographic. Surely the appellants would not insist that a 
prompt post-seizure hearing be carried out where evidentiary 
photographs of a rape are seized under a valid warrant. Whether 
such photographs are or are not legally obscene is irrelevant in 
aetermining their probative value as evidence of a crime. Such is 
also the case here where, although the crime involved may be seen 
as a "sex crime," obscenity is not at issue. 
Characterizing this case as one involving free speech 
issues, protections and safeguards is an attempt to fit a square 
peg into an unyielding round hole. Because free speech, free 
expression, and other First Amendment rights are not at issue 
here, neither are statutorv requireme~ts set up to insure that 
those rights are not violated. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully 
submits that the decision of the trial court be affirmed. 
19 82. 
Respectfully submitted this /(,,-ft! day of September, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
'-f'd~ 
EARL F .. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Michael D. Esplin, 43 East 200 
North, P .. O. Box "L," Provo, Utah, 84603, and W .. Andrew McCullough, 
930 South State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, Attorneys for 
Appellants, this /1J:i1 day of September, 1982. 
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.n.r r .1:::.d.~LJ.l..X "A" 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF UTAH. 
CIRCUIT COURT, OREM DEPARTMENT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PETITION FOR AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT 
I, J. Stewart Winn, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and 
say; 
1. That your affiant is a Police Officer employed by the City 
of Orem and has been so employed for the past three years. 
2. That in that capacity on or about the 3rd day of November 
1981, I received infonnation from a confidential infonnant, whose code 
name is "Gorgo," that a quantity of nude photographs, corrmonly referred 
to as 11 child pornography" is being secreted at the address of 754 South 
50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah. The pornography is in the possession 
of Terry Fullmer, a white female and of.Robert Jordan, a black male. 
The minor involved is a 15-year old female runaway, by the name of 
Holly Wi 1 kerson. 
~Detective Ralph Crabb has been involved in the investigation of 
Holly Wilkerson as a runaway child. The most recent runaway report 
came in at 4:36 p.m. on October 31, 1981. The evening of October 31, 
1981, Detective Crabb met with W.G. Wilkerson, Holly's father, who 
supplied him with a list of names, any of whom Holly could have been 
staying with. Two of the names on the list were Terry Fullmer and a 
black named Robert Jordan. Mr. \~ilkerson's information is that 
Fullmer and Jordan are living together at 754 South 50 East, Orem, 
Utah County, Utah. Holly ~~ilkerson is still a runaway. 
4. Confidential informant "Gorgo" visited Robert Jordan at 
754 South 50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah, on November l, 1981. 
Terry Fullmer offered to sell "Gorgo" some stolen unexposed film. 
11 Gorgo 11 asked what they used the film for. They then showed him a 
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stack of approximately fifty polaroid snapshots. They all showed Holly 
Wilkerson, Terry Fullmer, and Robert Jordan engaging in, or simulating 
sex acts. 11 Gorgo 11 describes Holly as approximately 15-years old, tall 
and redheaded. That matches the physical description of the runaway 
Holly Wilkerson. 11 Gorgo 11 was told that they intend to sell the 
photographs to "Penthouse Magazine." 
5. Robert Jordan and Terry Fu11mer are living at 754 South 50 
East, Orem, Utah County, Utah. This has been verified through Walls 
Harlow, their landlord. 754 South 50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah, 
is further described as a red, brick four-plex on the west side of 
50 East street at 754 South, and is the south apartment on the second 
level with the numbers 754 next to the door. 
6. The materials sought by this application for a search 
warrant are being held in violation of the Utah Criminal Code and are 
evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor. Wherefore, I respectfully 
request that this court issue its warrant for the search at any time of 
the day the south apartment on the upper level of 754 South 50 East, 
Orem, Utah County, Utah, for the presence therein of child pornography 
and other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor. 
7. The above-mentioned informant has proven reliable 
in the past assisting this department in numerous narcotic 
operations now pending prosecution. ~-~~~ 
A F F I A N T 
Subscribed and sworn to before this <_3""{ day of November, 1981 
~~---
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n.r r .r:..l.\ILJ .LX "B" 
CIRCUIT COURT, OREM DEPARTMENT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: J. Stewart Winn, OREM CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and 
to any other peace officer in Utah County in assistance: 
Proof by affidavit having been made before me this ~~-day 
of November, 1981, that there is probable and reasonable cause to 
believe that there is presently located in the following described 
premises the property set forth below; 
NOW, THEREFORE YOU AND EACH OF YOU are hereby directed to 
conduct an irrr.iediate search during the daylight hours of an apartment 
on the south side of the upper level of a red, brick four-plex, further 
identifieG by the number 754 by the door, said apartment being located 
at 754 South 50 East Street, Orem, Utah County, Utah, for the presence 
therein of child pornography, and other evidence of sexual exploitation 
of a minor. If you find the same, you are directed to bring it forth-
with before me at the above Court or hold the same in your possession 
pending further order of this Court. 
Date this 3 rJ... day of November, 1981. 
THIS WARRANT SHALL EXECUTE WITHIN TEN DAYS OF THE DATE OF ITS ISSUANCE. 
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APPENDIX "C" 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
INVENTORY of property taken from the residence of Robert Jordan 
and Terry Fullmer, located at 754 South 50 East,Orem, Utah County, Utah 
by authority of the Search Warrant issued by Robert J·. Sumsion, Judge, 
8th Circuit Court, Orem, County of Utah, dated November 3, 1981. 
1. Assorted Instant Photographs 
2. Unexposed 35rrm Film 
3. Flash Cubes 
4. Cloth Sack 
5. Unexposed Polaroid Film 
6. General Electric Color Television Set 
I, J. Peter Hansen, the officer by whom this warrant was executed, 
do swear that the above inventory contains a true and detailed statement 
of all property taken by me on the said warrant. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ~day of November, 1981. 
STATE OF UTAH 
cournv OF u1.ci.H 
hereby certify that I have served the warrant and have the 
property described therein in the Orem Police Department Evidence Room 
and have the goods detailed in the inventory endorsed hereon in Court. 
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.c:l..CI:.C.J.\JLJJ.h "l)" 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Utah County Attorney 
Room 107, County Building 
Provo, .Utah 84601 
OREM 
______________ DEPARTMENT 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- : INFORMA-TION 
ROBERT JORDAN, JR., 
TERRY L. FULL.MER, 
Defendant(s). Criminal No. 
3 .2 "2. 
---------------------------------------~------------------------------
The undersigned PETE HANSEN under oath 
states on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the 
crime(s) of: 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR, a Second Degree 
~~¥.l~IS:­Felony, at Utah County, Utah, on or about Ns¥sRl:Ber ~, ' 
1981, in violation ot' 76-10-1206.5, Utah Criminal Code, 
as amended, in that they, at the time and place aforesaid, 
knowingly and intentionally used, persuaded, induced~ (J?,... 
enticed Holly Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the nude while 
simulating sexual conduct for th~ purpose of .photographing, 
filming 1 recording, .or displaying sexual or simulated sexual 
conduct. 
Thi~ information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Pete Hansen 
County Attorney 
Subscribed and sworn ~9 before r.;a 
this 4* day of f!'M_eV , 1911-
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OPINIONS OF THE UNITED ST AT.ES 
SUPREME COURT 
NEW YORK '· FERBER. No. 81-55 
FIRST AMENDMENT .. 254.70 - A New York c:ri.miaJ 
statwte taat, in order to ptt¥ent d:te sexual expk>itatioR ud abme 
or cWktren, prohibits penoDS from bowi.ngly proclucing, direct-
mi. or ~ material daat Tisually depicts sexual CODduct by 
cWktree aader 16, repnl1ess of wbetber such material is obsceee, 
is 90t sabstantially ~erbroad and does DOt tiolate tt.e FtrSt 
A.mendmetrt; child poraograpby, like obscenity, is unprotected by 
die First AIDeDdmeat., ud diius material containing risuaJ depic-
tions of specified sexual conduct by children below a specific a,e 
-Y be proscribed "'en if the material does aot appeal to tae 
pnrient illterest of the Hentp person and the sexual coed.act is 
IOt portrayed ia. ,.tatdy otfemi.e llWIDer. 
Full T~xt of Opinion 
No. 81-66 
NEWYOR~ PETITIONER v. PAUL IRA FERBER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF NEW YORK 
Syllabua 
No. 81-66. Arped April Z'l, 1982-Decided July 1. 1982 
A N~ Y erk atatute prohibit.a penom from lmowingiy promoting a Bern.I 
performance by a ebild under the are of 16 by distributing material 
NOTICE.: That opinions ue .,b,;eet to formal revmon befo~ public>-
liOll in the prdimin&ry print of the United States Reporu. Readers an: 
req1&11&d to notify the kcporter of Deciaons., Supreme Court of the 
Untted Statei, fliuhinrtoc. D.C. 20543, of any typograpb.K:a.l or other 
formal erron, iri onic:r that ccmecDoru may be made before the prelimt-
nary print goes tt> prea. 
wbich ~ IDc:b a performanee. Tbe ltatUte defines "'6wLI perfor-
mance" u 111y performance that includes eexual conduct by such a child, 
and .. leXUa} conciuc:t" ia in tam defined U actual OT Kimulated NXUal in-
tercounle, deviate llexua1 im.ercoune, leXU&l bestiality I muturb&tion, 
uOo-muochiltic &bu.le, or ~exhibition of the ~- Respondent 
bookstore proprietor WU COBvieted under' the statute for eelling filma de-
pctmr young boys muturbating, and the Appellate Division of the New 
Yark Suprene Court atfi:rmed. The New Yark Court of Appeal.a re-
ftl'Wi, holding that the statute violated the First Amencbnent u being 
both u.nderincluaive and ~- Tbe eoart reuoned that in light of 
the explicit inclusion of an obeeenity lt&Ddard in a companion statute 
banning the ~ di,uemjnarion of similarly deftDed material, the 
atatute in question could DOt be COllStl'ued to iDdude an obtcenity stand. 
ard, and tberefon would probibtt the ):lftJmOtion of material.a tndition-
ally entitied to protection under the First Amendment. 
Bel.ti· Al. applied to respaodmt md d:hen who distribute limilaT material, 
the statUte in question does DOt. violate the First A mendmem » applied 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
(a) The States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of por-
nographic depictions of chi1dl"en for the following reaaon.a: Cl) the legisla-
tive judgment that the uae ol children u subjeets of pornographic ma· 
terial.e is harmtul to to ~ emotional. and mental health of the 
c:hild, easily pweg aiuster unde?" the First A mendtnent; (2) the st.andm-cl 
of Miller v. Ca.J.ifonc.ia, U3 U. S. 15, fer determining what i& leg&lly ~ 
~ ia not.~ ~ution to the child pornography problem; (3) 
the adverti&ing and loelling of chiki pornography provide& an economic 
motive for and ia tbm an int.eg:n.1 part of the JrOCiucticm of such materi-
als, an aetivity illepl througbout the Nation; (4) the value of permitting 
Im performances and pbotognphic ~of children enpged ill 
lewd uhibitiom ia exceedingly modest, if not dL. minim16; and (5) rec-
ognizing and ciusifying child pamoeraphy u a catagory of material out-
llide the First Amendment's pr.otec:tion is not incompatible with um 
c.ourt'a dec:iaiom dealin( wtth W'hat speech is l.Dlproteeted. When a de-
tmabie claaa of materi&1. such u that covered by the New York statllte, 
bean IO heavily and pe?'\'&IQvely Oil the welfare of children enpred in it.a 
product.ion, the balance of competing interest.a jg clearly struck, and it iB 
permiaaible to COMide:?-~ materWa .. without the First Amend-
ment's protection. 
(b) The New Yark atar.ut.e dellCribel a eaterm"Y of material the pro-
duction and distribution rl which is not entitled to First Amendment pro-
t.ection. A.ccord:i.n¢y. there is nothing unccm.rtitutionally "underinclu-
sin" about the statute, and the Su.t.e ia not ba.rTed by the Finn 
Amendment from prohibiting the di&tribution of such unprotected ma-
teriall produced out.aide the State. . 
(c) Nor ia the New Y cri. ll:t&tUU ~ over-broad u for· 
~ the clist:ribution of ID&teri.al with leriou.a literary, scientiiiC, or 
value. Tb! .w:.witial overtreath rule of B~ v. 
OCloJwmi4, .&13 U. S. 6(i, applieL Tma i& the ~ cue of a 
state statute wbme ~ !ecb dwarb n. arguably impermiaai~ 
mpplicatiom ~ve- overlradth m.ta sboWd ~ elll"ed thJ"oug:h 
~-cue ma1yD of the fact ~ to which [the statute's) ~ 
tiam, UM!l"tedly. may~ applied.. ~ v. o~. nq:wu, at 
61Ml6. 
52 N.Y. 2d 674., m N.E. 2d 523, ~and remanded. 
NOTE: Where it ii deemed desintK, a syllabus {beMi:Potc) will be 
reS:ued • • • at 1he time the opinion is ~ Tbe ryllab1u comtituta 
DO pc1 of the opJnjcxi of the Court bot bas been prepared by the 
Jl.eportc- of Deciliom for the coo-uence of the reader. Sec Urriud Sma 
I'. ~t10i1 UJmMr Co., 200 U.S. 321. 337. 
Copynght c 1982 by The Bureau of National At'taJr&, Inc. 
0011·13'1/82/I00.50 
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WHITE. J. 1 delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and POWELL. REHNQl,1ST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., 
filed a eoncuni.ng opinion. BRENN AN, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
th"' judgment, in which MARsHALL, J., joined. BLACKMUS, J., concurred 
in the result. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
At issue in this case is th constitutionality of a New York 
criminal statute which prohibits persons from knowingly pro-
moting sexual performances by children under the age of 16 
by distributing material which depicts such performances. 
I 
In recent years, the exploitive use of children in the pro-
duction of pornography has become a serious national prol>-
lem.1 The federal government and forty-seven States have 
sought to combat the problem with statutes specifically di-
rected at the production of child pornography. At least half 
of such statutes do not require that the materials produced be 
legally obscene. Thirty-five States. and the United States 
Congi-ess have also passed legislation prohibiting the distri-
bution of such materials; twenty States prohibit the distribu-
tion of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct 
v.ithout requiring that the material be legally obscene. 2 
'"Child pornography and child prostitution have become highly orga-
nized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale." S. 
Rep. No. 95-438, p. 5 (1978). One researcher has documented the exis-
tenee of over 260 different magazines which depict children engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct. Ibid. "Such magazines depict children, some 
as young as three to five years of age . . . The activities featured range 
from lewd poses to intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, rape, 
inl:'est and sado-m.asochism." Id., at 6. In Los Angeles alone. police re-
ported that 30,000 children have been sexually exploited. Sexual Exploi-
tation of Children, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Select Education 
of the House Comm. on Ed. and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st ~ss .. 41-42 (1977). 
2 In addition to New York, nineteen Statei; have prohibited the dissemi-
nation of material depicting children engaged in sexUAJ conduct regardless 
of whether the material is obscene. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § l~ 
<Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-403 (Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann., 
Tit. 11, § § 1108, 1109 0979); Fla. Stat. § 847.014 (1976); Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 707-751 <Supp. 1981); Ky. Rev. Stat.§§ 531.320, 531.340-531.360 0980); 
La. Rev. Stat. § 14:81.l(A)(3) <West Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., 
ch. 272, § 29A (West Supp. 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145c(3) (1982); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-33(4) (Supp. 1981); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-625 
0981); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:24-4(b)(5) (West 1981); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, 
§ 1021.2 (Supp. 1981-1982); Pa. Com. Stat. § 6312(c) (1982): R. I. Gen. 
Laws § 11-9-1.l (1981); Tex. Penal Code Ann. Tit. 9, § 43.25 (1982); Utah 
Code Ann. § 7~10-1206.5(3) (Supp. 1981); W. Va. Code§ 61-SC-3 (Supp. 
1981 ); Wis. Stat. § 940.203(4) (West) (Supp. 1981-1982). 
FL"teen States prohibit the dissemination of such material only if it is ob-
scene. Ala. Code § 13-7-231, 13-7-232 (Supp. 1981); Ark. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-4201 <Supp. 1981); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3ll.2(b) (1970) (general ob-
5-cenitv statute); Ill. Stat. ch. 38. § ll-20a(b)(l) (1979); lnci. Code 
§ ~10.1-2 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2923(1) (Supp. 
l"Si-1982): Minn. Stat. §617.246(3) and (4) <Supp. 1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 28-1463(2) 0979); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 650:2(!!) (Supp. 1981); N. D. 
Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-01 (1976) (general obscenity statute); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. §2907.32l(A) 0982); Ore. Rev. Stat. §163.485 (1981); S. D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § § 22-22-24, 22-22-25 0979); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 39-1020 (1981); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.68A.030 (1981). The federal stat-
Ulf:' also prohibits dissemination only if the material is obscene. 18 
V. S. C. § 2252(a) (1976 Supp. IV). Two States prohibit dissemination 
only if the material is obsce;1e as to minors. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 53a-196b (Supp. 1982); Va. Code§ 18.2-374.l 0982). 
Tvvelve State~ prohibit only the use of minors in the production of the 
material. Ala.ska Stat. Ann. § 11.41.455 (1981); Ga. Code § 2&-9943(a) 
(Supp. 1981); Idaho Code§ 44-1306 (1979); Iowa Code§ 728.12 (1979): Kan. 
S:.at. Ann. § 21-3516 (1981 ); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. § 419A (Supp. 
1981); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 568.060<l)(b) 0979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.509 
(1981); ~. M. Stat. Ann. §30-6-10980); N. C. Gen. Stat.§ 1~190.60981); 
S. C. Code§ 1~15-380 (1981); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-102(a)(v)(E) (19i7). 
31 CrL 3140 
New -~··· M;t "'.," v1. ..... "" ...... cui...r. u1J..'711, 1.ne .New York 
legislature enacted Article 263 of its Penal Law. Section 
263. 05 criminalizes as a class C felony the use of a child in a 
sexual performance: 
"A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual per. 
formance if 1mowing the character and content thereof 
he employs, authorizes or induces a child less than six-
teen years of age to engage in a sexual performance or 
being a parent, legal guardian OT custodian of such child 
he consents to the participation by such child in a sexuai 
performance." 
A "sexual performance is defined as 'any performance or part 
thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than six-
teen years of age,'" §26?.l. "Sexual conduct" is in turn de-. 
fined in § 263.3: 
" 'Sexual conduct' means actual or simulated sexual in· 
tercourse, de\'iate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, 
masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhi-
bition of the genitals." 
A performance is defined as "any play, motion picture, photo-
graph or dance" OT "any other visual presentation exhibited 
before an audience." § 263.4 
At issue in this case is § 263.15, defining a class D felony:3 
"A person is guilty of promoting a sexual perf onnance 
by a child when, knowing the character and content 
thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any perfor-
mance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than 
sixteen years of age." 
To "promote" is also defined: 
"'Promote' means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell. 
give, provide, lend, mail, deliver. transfer, transmute, 
publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, ex-
hibit or advertise, or to off er or agree to do the same." 
A companion provision bans only the lmowing dissemination 
of obscene material. § 263.10. 
This case arose when Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a Man· 
hattan bookstore specializing in sexually oriented products, 
sold two films to an undercover police officer. The films are 
devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys mastur· 
bating. Ferber was indicted on two counts of§ 263.10 and 
two counts of §263.15, the two New York laws controlling 
dissemination of child pornography.' After a jury trial, Fer-
ber was acquitted of the two counts of promoting an obscene 
sexual performance, but found guilty of the two counts under 
§ 263.15, which did not require proof that the films were ob-
scene. Ferber's convictions were affirmed v.ithout opinion 
by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme 
Court. 72 A.D. 2d, 558, 42.f K.Y.S. 2d, 967. 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
§263.15 violated the First Amendment. 52 N.Y. 2d, 6i4, 
422 N.E. 2d, 523 (1981). The court began by noting that in 
light of § 263. lO's explicit inclusion of an obscenity standard, 
§ 263.15 could not be construed to include such a standard. 
Therefore, "the statute would . . . prohibit the promotion of 
materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional 
i Class D felonies carry a maximum punishment for up to seven yeJJ"S as 
to individuals, and as to corporatioru a fine of up to Sl0.000. N.Y. Penal 
Law §§ 70.00, 80.10. Respondent Ferber was sent.enced to 45 days in 
orison. 
•The trial judge rejected Ferber's Fi.""St Amendment attack on the two 
sect.ions in denying a motion to dismiss the i.ndicunent. 96 Misc. 2d 669, 
409 N. Y.S. 2d 632 (1978). 
. ..: ~·· 
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protection from government interference under the First 
Amendment." 52 N.Y. 2d at 678, 422 N.E. 2d at 525. Al-
though the court recognized the State's "legitimate interest 
in protecting the welfare of minors" and noted that this "in-
terest may transcend First Amendment concerns," 52 N. Y. 
2d at 679, 422 N .E. 2d at 526, it nevertheless found two fatal 
defects in the New York statute. Section 263.15 was 
underinclusive because it discriminated against visual por-
trayals of children engaged in sexual activity by not also 
prohibiting the distribution of films of other dangerous activ-
ity. It was also overbroad because it prohibited the distri-
bution of materials produced outside the State, as well as ma-
terials, such as medical books and educational sources, which 
"deal with adolescent sex in a realistic but nonobscene man-
ner." 52 N.Y. 2d at 681, 422 N.E. 2d at 526. Two judges 
dissented. We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 
- U. S. -- (1981), presenting the single question: 
"To prevent the abuse of children who are made to en-
gage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, could 
the New York State Legislature, consistent with the 
First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination of material 
which shows children engaged in sexual conduct, regard-
less of whether such material is obscene?" 
II 
The Court of Appeals proceeded on the assumption that 
the standard of obscenity incorporated in §263.10, which fol-
lows the guidelines enunciated in Miller v. California, 413 
U. S. 15 (1973)," constitutes the appropriate line dividing 
protected from unprotected expression by which to measure 
a regulation directed at child pornography. It was on the 
premise that ''nonobscene adolescent sex" could not be sin-
gled out for special treatment that the court found § 263.15 
"strikingly underinclusive." Moreover, the assumption that 
the constitutionally permissible regulation of pornography 
could not be more extensive with respect to the distribution 
of material depicting children may also have led the court to 
conclude that a narrowing construction of § 263.15 was 
·unavailable. 
The Court of Appeals' assumption was not unreasonable in 
light of our decisions. This case, however, constitutes our 
first examination of a statute directed at and limited to depic-
tions of sexual activity involving children. We believe our 
inquiry should begin with the question of whether a State has 
somewhat more freedom in proscribing works which portray 
sexual acts or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by children. 
A 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), 
the Court laid the foundation for the excision of obscenitv 
from the realm of constitutionally protected expression: • 
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . . 
It has been well observed that such utterances are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest and morality .... "Id., at 571-572. 
Embracing this judgment, the Court squarely held in Roth 
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), that ''obscenity is not 
'New York Penal Law §235.00 (1) (1980); People v. Illardo, 48 :S.Y. 2d 
408. 415 and n. 3; 399 N .E. 2d 59, 62-63 and n. 3 09i9). 
6-30-82 
'Within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." ! d .• at 485. The Court recognized that "rejection of obscen-
1t~ ~.utterly without redeeming social importance" was im-
plicit m the history of the First Amendment: The original 
states .Provided for the prosecution of libel, blasphemy and 
profaruty and the ''universal judgment that obscenity should 
be restrained [is) refiected in the international agreement of 
over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 states 
and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by Congress from i842 
to 1956." Ibid. 
Roth was followed by fifteen years ·during which this Court 
struggled with "the intractable obscenity problem." Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704 (1968) (Har-
lan, J.). See, e. g., Redru.p v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 
(1967). Despite considerable vacillation over the proper def-
inition of obscenity, a majority of the members of the Court 
remained firm in the position that ''the States have a legiti-
mate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of ob-
scene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it 
a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling 
recipients or of exposure to juveniles." Miller v. California, 
413 U. S., at 19; Stanley v. Georgi.a., 394 U. S. 557, 567 
(1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-643 (1968); 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, supra., at 690; Red.rup v. 
New York, supra, at 769; Jacobelli8 v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 
195 (1964). 
Throughout this period, we recognized "the inherent dan-
gers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression." 
Miller v. California, 413 U. S., at 23. Consequently, our dif-
ficulty was not only to assure that statutes designed to regu-
late obscene materials sufficiently defined what was prohib-
ited, but to devise substantive limits on what fell within the 
permissible scope of regulation. In Miller v. California, 
supra., a majority of the Court agreed that "a state offense 
must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal 
to the prurient interest in sex, which port.ray sexual conduct 
in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do 
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value." 413 U. S., at 24. Over the past decade, we have 
adhered to the guidelines expressed in Miller, 6 which subse-
quently has been followed in the regulatory schemes of most 
states.7 
1 Ha.mling v. United Sta.tu, 418 U. S. 87 (1974); Jenkim v. Georgia, 418 
U. S. 153 (1974); Ward v. Illifi.OU, 431 U. S. 767 (1977); Marks v. United 
Sta.tes. 430 U. S. 188 0977); Pinku.8 v. United States, 436 U. S. 293 (1978). 
'Thirty-seven State5 and the District of Columbia have either legisla· 
tive!y adopted or judicially incorporated the Miller test for obseenity. 
Ala. Code § 13A-l2-150 (Supp. 1981); Am.. Rev. StaL Ann. § 13-3501C2) 
(1978); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3502(6) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ l~ i-101(2) (Supp. 1981 ): Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 1364 <Supp. 1981); 
Lakin v. United Stat.es, 363 A. 2d 990 COCCA 1976); Ga. Code § 2~210Hb) 
0978); Haw. Rev. Stat. § il2-1210<6) (Supp. 1981); ldaho Code 
§ l8-4101(A) (1979); Iowa Code § 228.4 (1979) (only child pornography cov-
ered); Ind. Code § 3&-30-10.1-l(c} (1979); Kan. St.aL Ann. § 21-4301 (2)(a) 
(1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 531.010(3) (1975); La. Rev. St.at. U4:106(A){2) & 
(A){3) (West Supp. 1982): Ebert v. Md. St. Bd ofCt:n.8<m, 19 Md. App. 300, 
316 A. 2d 536 (1974); Mus. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 272, § 31 (West Supp. 
1982); People v. Neu:mo.yer, 405 Mich. 341, 275 N. W. 2d 230 (1979); Sta.t.e 
v. Welke, 298 Minn. 40'l, 216 N. W. 2d 641 (1974); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 5i3.010{1) (1979); Neb. Rev. Stat., § 28-807(9) (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 201.235 (1981); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 650:l(IV) (Supp. 1981); N. J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-2 (\Vest Supp. 1981); N. Y. Penal Law § 235.00(1) 
(1980); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-l~l(b) (1981); K D. Cent. Code 
§ 12.l-27.1-Ql(4) (1976); Sta.le v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354. 384 K. E. 2d 
255 (Ohio 1978): McCrory v. State, 533 P. 2d 629 <Okla. Crim App. 1974); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 16i.08i(2) 0981); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5903Cbl 0982); R. 
I. Gen. Laws § 11-31-1 (1981); S. C. Code § 16-1~260\a) 0981); S. D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-24-27(10) (19i9); Tenn. Code Ann. ~ 39-300107) 
(1981); Tex.as Penal Code Ann. § 43.2l(a) (1982); t.:tah Code Ann. 
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ts 
The Miller standard, like its predecessors, was an accom-
modation between the state's interests in protecting the 
"sensibilities of unwilling recipients" from exposure to porno-
graphic material and the dangers of censorship inherent in 
unabashedly content-based laws. Like obscenity statutes, 
laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run 
the risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the 
hand of the censor to become unduly heavy. For the follow-
ing :reasons, however, we are persuaded that the States are 
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic 
depictions of children. 
First. It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a 
state's interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychologi-
cal well being of a minor" is "compelling." Globe Newspapers 
v. Superior Court, - U.S.-, - (1982). "A demo-
cratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy 
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as cit-
izens." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168 (1944). 
Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protect-
ing the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when 
the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitution-
ally protected rights. In Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 
the Court held that a statute prohibiting use of a child to dis--
tribute literature on the street was valid notwithstanding the 
statute's effect on a First Amendment activity. In Ginsberg 
'"New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), we sustained a New York 
law protecting children from exposure to nonobscene litera-
ture. Most recently, we held that the government's interest 
in the "well-being of its youth" justified special treatment of 
indecent broadcasting received by adults as well as children. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). 
The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes ·a government objective of surpassing impor-
tance. The legislative findings accompanying passage of the 
New York laws reflect this concern: 
"There has been a proliferation of children as subjects in 
sexual performances. The care of children is a sacred 
trust and should not be abused by those who seek to 
profit through a commercial network based on the 
exploitation of children. The public policy of the state 
demands the protection of children from exploitation 
through sexual performances." Laws of N. Y., 1977, ch. 
910,§1. 8 
§ 7&-1~1203(1) (1978); Va. Code § 18.2-372 (1982); 1982 Wash. La~rs .. Ch. 
184, § 1(2). 
Four States continue to follow the test approved in Memoi.n v. Massa-
chusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966). Cali!. Penal Code Ann. § 3ll(a) (Supp. 
1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-1S.3 (Supp. 1982); Fla. Stat. § 847.07 (1976); 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § ll-2CKb) (1979). Five States regulate only the dis-
tribution of pornographic mater"ial to minors. Me. Rev. Stat. A:m., Tit. 
l i. § 2911 (Supp. 1981-82J; Mont. Code Ann. ~ 45-8-201 0981); N. M. Stat. 
.A.nn. § 30-37-2 (1980); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 2802 (1981); W. Va. Code, 
§ 61-8A-2 (1977). Three State obscenity laws do not fall into any of the 
above categories. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-33 (l9i3), declared invalid in 
ABC Interstate Th«zt:res, Inc. v. State, 32.5 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1976); Wisc. 
St.at. § 944.2l(l)(a) (1977), declared invalid in State v. Pri.ncess Cinema of 
Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 292 N. W. 2d 807 (1980); Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-5-303 (1977.) Alaaka has no current state obscenity law. 
A number of States employ a different obscenity standard with respect 
to material distributed to children. See, e.g., Fla. Stat.§ 847.0125 (1976). 
' In addition, the legislature found: 
"mhe sale of these movies, ma.gaz:ines, and photographs depicting the sex-
ual conduct of children to be so abhorrent to the fabric of our society that it 
urges law enforcement officers to aggressively seek out and prosecute both 
the peddlers of this filth by vigorously apply'ing the sanctions contained in 
this act." Law of N.Y., 1977, ch. 910, ~ 1. 
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spondent has not intimated that we do so. Suffice it to sa) 
that virtually all of the States and the United States havE 
passed legislation proscribing the production of or otherwise 
combatting "child pornography." The legislative judgment, 
as well as the judgment found in the relevant literature, is 
that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials 
iE harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health 
of the child. v That judgment, we think, easily passes mus-
ter under the First Amendment. 
Second. The distribution of photographs and films depict-
ing sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the 
sexual abuse of children in at least two ways. First, the ma-
terials produced are a permanent record of the children's par. 
ticipation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their 
circulation. 10 Second, the distribution network for child por-
nography must be closed if the production of material which 
requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively 
• "The use of children as . • . subjects of pornographic materials is very 
harmful to both the children and the society as a whole." S. Rep. No. 
95-438, p. 5 (1978). It has been found that sexually exploited childl'en are 
unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have sex-
ual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults. 
Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J. Am. 
Acad. Child Psych. 289, 296 (1980) (hereafter cited as Child Exploitation); 
Schoettle, Treatment of the Child Pornography Patient, 137 Am. J. Psych. 
1109, 1110 (1980); Densen-Gerner, Child Prostitution and Child Pornogra-
phy: Medical, Legal and Societal Aspects of the Commercial Exploitation 
of Children, reprinted in U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Sex· 
ual Abuse of Children: Selected Readings at 80 (1980) <hereafter cited as 
Commercial Exploit.ation) (sexually exploited children predisposed to self· 
destructive beha>ior such as drug and alcohol abuse or prostitution). See 
generally A. Burgess & L Holmstrom, Aeeessory-t<rSex: Pressure, Sex 
and Secrecy, in Burgess, Sexual Assault of Children and Adolsecents BS, 
94 (1978); V. De Francis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Com-
mitted by Adults, 169 (1969): Ellerstein & Canavan, Sexual Abuse of Boys, 
134 Arn. J. Diseases of Children 255, 256-257 (1980); Finch, Adult Seduc-
tion of the Child: Effects on the Child, 7 Med. Aspects of Human Sexuality 
170, 185 (1973); Groth, Sexual Traum.a in the Life Histories of Rapists and 
Child Molesters, 4 Victimology 10 0979). Sexual molestation by adults is 
often involved in the production of child sexual performances. SeXUil 
Exploitation of Children. A Report to Illinois General Assembly by the Illi· 
nois Legislative Investigatory Comm'n at 30-31 (1980) (hereafter cited as 
Ill. Comm'n). 'Wben such performances are recorded and distributed. the 
child's privacy interests are also invaded. See n. 10, infra.. 
10 As one authority has explained: 
"Pornography poses an even greater t.Ve&t to the child victim than does 
sexual abuse of prostitution. Because the child's actions are reduced to a 
recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the 
original misdeed took place. A child who has posed for the camera must 
go through life knowing t:Mt the recording is circulating within the mass 
distribution system for child pornograp~y." Shouvlin. Preventing the 
Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, li Wake Forest L. Rev. 
535, 545 (1981) . 
See also Schoettle, Child Exploitation. at 292 Cil)t is the fear of exposure 
and the tension of keeping the act secret that seem to have the most pro-
found emotional reperrussions I; ~ ote, Protection of Children frorr. Use in 
Pornography: Toward Con.~tutional and Enforceable Legislation. 12 J. 
295, 301 (1979) U. Mich. J. Law Reform (thereafter cit.eel as Use in Pornog· 
raphy) (interview with child psychiatrist.) ('"the victims knowledge of publi· 
cation of the visual material incre~ the emotional and psychic harm suf· 
fered by the child ... ). 
Thus, distribution of the material violates '"the indhidual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Whalen,._ Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
599-600 (197i) (footnotes omitted). Repondents annot undermine the 
force of the privacy interests involved here by looking to Ccn Broadc;o.ltit&g 
Ccrrp v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 468 (1975) and Smith v. Do.ily Mail Publiah.ing 
Co., 443 U. S. 9i (1979), cases protecti'lg the Tight of newspapen to pu~ 
lish, respectively, the identity of a rape •;ctim and a youth charged as a 
juvenile offender. Those cases only stand for the proposition tha: if a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public 
signi..fica.nce, the state officials may not constitutionally punish publication 
of the information absent a need of the highest order." 
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controUed. Indeed, there is no senous contention that the 
legislature was unjustified in believing that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to halt the exploitation of children by pursu-
ing only those who produce the photographs and movies. 
While the production of pornographic materials is a low-pro-
file. clandestine industry, the need to market the resulting 
products requires a visible apparatus of distribution. The 
most expeditious if not the only practical method of law en-
forcement may be to dry up the market for this material by 
im~sing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, ad-
vertising, or otherwise promoting the product. Thirty-five 
States and Congress have concluded that restraints on the 
distribution of pornographic materials are required in order 
to effectively combat the problem, and there is a body of lit-
erature and testimony to support these legislative conclu-
sions.11 Cf. United St.ates v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) 
(upholding federal restrictions on sale of goods manufactured 
in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act). 
Respondent does not contend that the State is unjustified 
in pursuing those who distribute child pornography. 
Rather, he argues that it is enough for the State to prohibit 
the distribution of materials that are legally obscene under 
the Miller test. While some States may find that this ap-
proach properly accommodates its interests, it does not fol-
low that that the First Amendment prohibits a State from go-
ing further. The Miller standard, like all general definitions 
of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the 
State's particular and more compelling interest in prosecut-
ing those who promote the sexual exploitation of children. 
Thus, the question under the Miller test of whether a work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of the aver-
age person bears no connection to the issue of whether a child 
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the produc-
tion of the work. Similarly, a sexually explicit depiction 
need not be "patently offensive" in order to have required the 
sexual exploitation of a child for its production. In addition, 
a work which, taken on the whole, contains serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value may nevertheless em-
body the hardest core of child pornography. "It is irrelevant 
to the child [who has been abused) whether or not the mate-
rial . . . has a literary, artistic, political, or social value." 
Memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in Support of§ 263.15. 
We therefore cannot conclude that the Miller standard is a 
satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem. 11 
11 See Sexual Exploitation of Children. Hea."1n2S before the Subcommit-
tee to I vestigate Juvenile Delinquency of the House Judiciary Comm., 95th 
Cong .. 1st Sess., 34 (1977) (statement of Charles Rembar) ("'It is an impos-
sible prosecutorial job to try to get at the acts themselves."); id., at 11 
(statement of Frank Osanka. Professor of Social Justice and Sociology) 
(w[W)e have to be very careful ... that we don't take comfort in the exis-
tence of statutes that are on the books in the connection with the use of 
children in pornography . . . There are usually no witnesses to these acts 
of producing pornography."); id., at 69 (statement of Investigator Lloyd 
~fartin. Los Angeles Police department) (producers of child pornography 
use false names making clifficult the tracing of mat.eria.l back from distribu-
tor). See al.so L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 666, n. 62 (1978); 
Pope, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. 
Ill. L. Forum, 711, 716, n. 29; Note, Use in Pornography at 315 ("passage 
of erim.inal laws aimed at producers without similar regulation of distribu-
tors will arguably shift the production process further underground."). 
u In addition. legal obscenity under M i1ler is a function of "contemporary 
community standards." 413 U.S., at 24. "It is neither realistic nor con-
stitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as reqWring that the peo-
ple of Maine or M.issippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable 
in Las Vegas or New York City." Id., at 32. It would be equally unre-
alistic to equate a community's toleration for sexually oriented material 
~ith the permissible scope of legislation aimed at protecting children from 
sexuaJ exploitation. Furthermore, a number of States rely on stricter ob-
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Third. The advertising and selling of child pornography 
provides an economic motive for and is thus an integral part 
of the production of such materials, an activity illegal 
throughout the nation. u "It rarely has been suggested that 
the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its 
immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of con-
duct in violation of a valid criminal statute." Giboney v. Em--
pire Storage & lee Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498 (1949). 14 We note 
that were the statutes outlawing the employment of children 
in these films and photographs fully effective, and the con· 
stitutionality of these laws have not been questioned, the 
First Amendment implications would be no greater than that 
presented by laws against distribution: enforceable produc· 
tion laws would leave no child pornography to be marketed. 1~ 
Fourth. The value of permitting live performances and 
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sex· 
ual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis. We 
consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children perform-
ing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often 
constitute an important and necessary part of a literary per-
formance or scientific or educational work. As the trial 
court in this case observed, if it were necessary for literary or 
artistic value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps 
looked younger could be µtilized. 11 Simulation outside of the 
prohibition of the statute could provide another alternative. 
Nor is there is any question here of censoring a particular lit-
erary theme or . portrayal of sexual activity. The First 
Amendment interest is limited to that of rendering the por-
trayal somewhat more "realistic" by utilizing or 
photographing children. 
Fifth. Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a 
category of material outside the protection of the First 
Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions. 
"The question whether speech is, or is not protected by the 
First Amendment often depends on the content of the 
speech." Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S. 50, 
66 (Opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by THE CHIEF Jus. 
TICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST). See al.so 
FCC v. Pacifica Fcru:ndation, 438 U. S. 726, 742-748 (1978) 
scenity tests, see note 7 11itpra, under which successful prosecution for 
child pornography may be even more difficulL 
u One state commision studying the problem declared, "The act of selling 
these materials is guaranteeing that there will be additional abuse of clill-
dren." Texas House Select Comm. on Child Pornography, Its Related 
Causes and Control 44 (1978). See also Densen-Gerber, Commercial 
Exploitation at 80 ("'Printed materials cannot be isolated or removed from 
the process involved in developing them."). 
•• In Giboney, a unanimous Court held that labor unions eould be re-
strallied from. picketing a firm in support of a secondary boycott which a 
State had validly ouiliiwed. In Pittsburgh Pre3s Co. v. PittBburgh 
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376 (1973), the Court allowed an 
injunction against a newspaper's furtherance of illegal sex discrimination 
by placing of job advertisements in gender-designated columns. The 
Court stated: 
"Any First Amendment interest which might be sen'ed by advertising an 
ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the gov-
ernment interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the 
commercial activity is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental 
to a valid limitation on economic activity." Id. at 389. 
.. In this connection we note that 18 U. S.C § 2251 (1979 Supp.), making 
it a federal offense for anyone to use children under the age of 16 in the 
production of pornographic materials, embraces all "sexually explicit con-
duct" without imposing an obscenity test. ln addition, half of the state 
laws imposing criminal liability on the producer do not require the '"isu.al 
mat.erial to be legally obscene. Note, Use in Pornography, at 307-308 
(1979). 
"96 Misc. 2d at 676, 409 N.Y.S. 2.d at 637. This is not merely a hyper 
thetical possibility. See Brief for Petitioner at 25 and examples cited 
therein. 
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(Opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by THE CHIEF JUS-
TICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST). "It is the 
content of an utterance that detenr.ines whether it is a pro-
tected epithet or an unprotected 'fighting comment.'" 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, at 66. See 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). 
Leaving aside the special considerations when public officials 
are the target, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
(1964), a libelous public.ation is not protected by the Constitu-
tion. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952). Thus, 
it is not rare that a content-based classific.ation of speech has 
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized 
that within the confines of the given classific.ation, the evil to 
be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive in-
terests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case ad-
judic.ation is required. When a definable class of material, 
such as that covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and perva-
sively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, 
we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck 
and that it is permissible to consider these materials as with-
out the protection of the First Amendment. 
c 
There are, of course, limits on the category of child pornog-
raphy which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First 
Amendment. AB with all legislation in this sensitive area, 
the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by 
the applicable state law, a.s written or authoritatively con-
strued. Here the nature of the harm to be combatted re-
quires that the state offense be limited to works that visu.ally 
depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age. 17 
The category of .. sexual conduct" proscribed must also be 
suitably limited and described. 
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscen-
ity standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared to it 
for purpose of clarity. The Miller formulation is adjusted in 
the following respects: A trier of fact need not find th.at the 
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average per-
son; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done 
so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue 
need not be considered as a whole. We note that the distri-
bution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, 
not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance 
or photographic or other visual reproduction of live perfor-
mances, retains First Amendment protection. AJ3 with ob-
scenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed 
\\ithout some element of scienter on the part of the defend-
ant. Smith v. Cal~fornia, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974). 
D 
Section 263.15's prohibition incorporates a defuljtion of 
sexual conduct that comports v.ith the above-stated princi-
p!es. The forbidden acts to be depicted are listed with suffi-
cient precision and represent the kind of conduct that, if it 
were the theme of a work, could render it legally obscene: 
'
7 Sixteen States define a child as a person unde:r age 18. Four States 
define a child as under 17 years old. The federal law and 16 States, includ· 
ing New Yo:rk, define a child as under 16. Illinois and Nebraska define 
define a child as a person under age 16 or who appean as a prepubes.cent. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § ll-20a (1978); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1463 (Supp. 
1S78). Indiana defines a child as one who is or appears to be under 16. 
Ind. Code. §§ 3&-30-10.1-2 to 3 (Supp. 1978). Kentucky provides for two 
age classifications (16 and 18) and varies punishment according to the vie. 
ti..'Tl'e age. Ky. Rev. Stat.§§ 531.300-.370 rSupp. 1978). See Note, Use in 
Pornography, at 307, n. 71 (collecting statutes). 
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course, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic 
abuse, or lewd ex.hlbition of the genitals." § 263.3. The 
term "lewd exhibition of the genitals" is not unlmown in this 
area and, indeed, was given in Miller as an example of a per-
missible regulation. 413 U. S., at 25. A performance is de-
fined only to include live or visual depictions: "any play, mo-
tion picture, photograph or dance . . . or other \-isual 
representation before an audience." § 263.4. Section 263.15 
expressly includes a scienter agreement. 
We hold that § 263.15 sufficiently describes a category of 
material the production and distribution of which is not enti-
tled to First Amendment protection. It is therefore clear 
that there is nothing .unconstitutionally "underinclusive" 
about a statute that singles out this c.ategory of material for 
proscription. u It also follows that the State is not ban-ed by 
the First Amendment from prohibiting the distribution of un-
protected materials produced outside the State . ., 
III 
It remains to address the claim that the New York statute 
is unconstitutionally overbroad because it would forbid the 
distribution of material with serious literary, scientific or 
educ.ational value or material which does not threaten the 
hanns sought to be combatted by the State. Respondent 
prevailed on that ground below, and it is to that issue that we 
now turn. 
The New York Court of Appeals recognized that 
overbreadth scrutiny has been limited with respect to con· 
duct-related regulation, Broadrick v. Okla.lwma, 413 U. S. 
601 (1973), but it did not apply the test enunciated in 
Broadrick because the challenged statute, in its view, was di-
rected at "pure speech." The court went on to find that 
§ 263.15 was fatally overbroad: "[T]he statute would prohibit 
the showing of any play or movie in which a child portrays a 
defined sexual act, real or simulated, in a nonobscene man-
ner. It would also prohibit the sale, showing, or distributing 
of medical or educational materials containing photographs of 
such acts. Indeed, by its terms, the statute would prohibit 
those who oppose such portrayals from providing illustra-
tions of what they oppose." 52 N. Y. 2d, at 678, 422 N. E. 2d, 
at 525. 
While the construction that a state court gives a state stat-
ute is not a matter subject to our review, Wainright v. Sterne, 
414 U. S. 21, ZZ-23 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 
520 (1972), this Court is the final arbiter of whether the fed-
eral constitution necessitated the invalidation of a state law. 
11 E1'%'111:1ntik v. City of Jackacmville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975), relied upon by 
the Court of Appeals, struck down a law a.g&i.nst drive-in theaters showing 
nude scenes if movie! eould be seen fl-om a public place. Since nudity. 
without more is protected expression. id .. at 213. we proceeded to co!l5ider 
the underi.nclusivene!! of the ordinance. The Jackson\'ille ordir.ance im-
pennissibly singled out movies with nudlty fo:r special treatment "l\·hile fail· 
ing to regulate other protected speech which created the same alleged risk 
to traffic. Today, we hold that child pornography as defined in§ 263.15 is 
unprotected speech subject to content-based regulation. Hence, it cannot 
be underinclusive or unconstitutional for a State to do precisely that.. 
••It is often impoeaible to determine wheJ"t> such material is produced. 
The Senate Report ..ccompanying federal child pornognphy legislation 
stJ"es&ed tha.t "it is quite common for photographs or films made in the 
United States to be sent to foreign eountries to be reproduced and then 
returned to this eountry in order to give the impression of foreign origin." 
S. Rep. No. 95-438, p. 6 (1978). In addltion, State! have not limited their 
distribution laW8 to mat.erial produced \\ithin their own borders because 
the ma.int.enanct' of the market it.self "leaves open the financ:W conduit by 
which the product.ion of such material is funded and mat.erially increases 
the risk t.h&t [local) children will be injured." 52 N.Y. 2d at 688; 422 N.E. 
2d at 531 (Judge Juan, dissenting). 
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erroneous applications of the Constitution that err on the side 
of an overly broad reading of our doctrines and precedents, 
as well as state court decisions giving the Constitution too lit-
tle shrift. A state court is not free to avoid a proper facial 
attack on federal constitutional grounds. Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U. S. 809, 817 (1975). By the same token, it 
should not be compelled to entertain an overbreadth attack 
when not req'Wred to do so by the Constitution. 
" A 
The traditional ru1e is that a person to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on 
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitution-
allv to others in situations not before the Court. Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 610; United States v. Raines, 362 
U. S. 17, 21 (1960); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Jack-
son Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217, 21S-220 (1912). In 
Broadrick, we recognized that this rule reflect two cardinal 
principles of our constitutional order. the personal nature of 
constitutional rights, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 
429 (1961), and prudential limitations on constitutional ad-
judication. 20 In United States v. Raines, supra, at 21, we 
noted the "incontrovertible proposition'' that it "would indeed 
be undesirable for this Court to consider every conceivable 
situation which might possibly arise in the application of com-
plex and comprehensive legislation," (quoting Barrows v. 
Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 256 (1953)). By focusing on the fac-
tual situation before us, and similar cases necessary for 
development of a constitutional rule, Zl we face ''fiesh-and-
blood" zz legal problems with data "relevant and adequate to 
an informed judgment.":1 This practice also fulfills a valu-
able institutional purpose: it allows state courts the opportu-
nitv to construe a law to avoid constitutional infirmities. 
What has come to be known as the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine is one of the few exceptions to this prin-
ciple and must be justified by "weighty countervailing poli-
cies." United States v. Raines, supra at 22-23. The doc-
. trine is predicated on the sensitive nature of protected 
expression: . "persons whose expression is constitutionally 
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for 
fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of applica-
tion to protected expression." Village of Schaumburg v. 
Citizens fora Better Envi:ronment, 444 U. S. 620, 634 (1980); 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 521 (1972). It is for this 
" In addition to prudential restraints, the traditional rule is grounded in 
Article III limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and 
controversies. 
"This Court. a.s is the case with all federal courts. 'has no jurisdiction to 
pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States. void. be-
cause irreconcilable v.ith the Constitution, except as it is called upon to ad-
judge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exerci.'"€ 
of that ju..'is<liction, it is bound by two rules to which it has rigidly adhered, 
one. never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 
necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional 
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.' 
Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emi-
9'J'Cltion, 113 U. S. 33, 39." United Stai& v. Raina, 362 U. S. 17, 21 
(1960). 
= Overbreadth challenges are only one type of facial attack. A person 
whose acti\iry may be constitutionally regulated nevertheless may argue 
that the statute under which he is convicted or regulat.ed is invalid on its 
face. See, e.g. Terrninello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. l, 5 (1949). See 
generally lionaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Review l, 10-14.. 
z: A. Bickel. The Least Dangerous Branch 115-116 (1962); 
zi Frankfurt.er & Han, The Business of the Supreme Court at October 
Term 1934. 49 Harv. L. Rev. 68. 95-96 0935). 
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reason that we have allowed persons to attack overly broad 
statutes even though the conduct of the person making the 
attack is clearly unprotected and could be proscribed by a law 
drawn with the requsite specificity. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 
380 U. S. 479, 486 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 
88, 97-98 (1940); United States v. Raines, supra at 21-22; 
Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 521. 
The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, 
like most exceptions to established principles, must be care-
fully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a 
statute is truly warranted. Because _of the wide.reaching ef-
fects of striking a statute down on its face at the request of 
one whose own conduct may be punished despite the First 
Amendment, we have recognized that the overbreadth doc-
trine is "strong medicine" and have employed it with hesita-
tion, and then "only as a last resort." Broadrick, 413 U. S., 
at 613. We have, in consequence, insisted that the 
overbreadth involved be "substantial" before the statute in-
volved will be invalidated on its face.,. 
In Broadrick, we explained the basis for this requirement: 
[T]he plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that 
facial overbreadth adjudication is the exception to our 
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a lim-
ited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise pro-
tected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction 
moves from ''pure speech" toward conduct and that con-
duct-even if expressive-falls 'Within the scope of other-
wise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state in-
terests in maintaining comprehensive controls over 
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. .Al-
though such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter pro-
tected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a 
point where that effect-at best a prediction-eannot, 
with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face 
and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute 
against conduct that is admittedly within its power to 
proscribe. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 
165, 174-175 (1969)." 413 U.S., at 615. 
We accordingly held that ''particularly where conduct and not 
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of 
a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, 
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 
lbid. 25 
,. When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as 
overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional 
problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction. Crowell 
v. Bem<11t, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Accord, e. g., Hayn.es v. United 
States, 390 U. S. 85. 92 (1968) (dictum); Schnieder v. Smith. 390 U.S. li, 
'li (1968); United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 45 (1953): Ash.wander v. 
Tennessee Valleu Autharity, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) CBrandeis, J. con-
curring). Furthermore, if the federal statute iE not subject to a na..'TOwing 
construction and is imperrnissibly overbroad, it nevertheless should not be 
stricken down on its face; if it i.s severable, only the unconstitutional por-
tion is to be invalidated. Un.ited St.a.tu v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 
u. s. 363 (1971). 
A state court is also free to deal with a state statute in the same way. If 
the invalid reach of the law is cured, there is no longer reason for proscrib-
ing the statute's application to unprotect.ed conduct. Here, of course, we 
are dealing with a state statute on direct review of a state court decision 
that bas constr11ed the statute. Such a construction is binding on us. 
-:> Parke-r v. Levy, 41i U. S. 733, 760 (1974) ("This Court bas ... repeat-
edly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its face where 
there• were a substantial number of situations to which it might be validly 
applied. Thus, even if there are m.art..nal applications in which a statute 
would infr.nge on First Amendment values. facial invalidation ii: inappro-
priate if the 'remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily 
identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct . . . conduct ... ' 
CSC v. Letter Carri.en, 413 U.S. 548, 580-581 (1973).'). See Bogen, 
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Broadrick was a regulation involving restrictions on politi-
cal campaign activity, an area not considered "pure speech," 
and thus it was unnecessary to consider the proper 
overbreadth test when a law arguably reaches traditional 
forms of expression such as books and films. As we inti-
mated in Broadrick, the requirement of substantial 
overbreadth extended "at the very least" to cases involving 
conduct plus speech. This case, which poses the question 
squarely, convinces us that the rationale of Broadrick is 
sound and should be applied in the present context involving 
the harmful employment of children to make sexually explicit 
materials for distribution. 
The premise that a law should not be invalidated for 
overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number of imper-
missible applications is hardly novel. On most occasions in-
volving facial invalidation, the Court has stressed the em-
bracing sweep of the statute over protected expression.• 
Indeed, JUSTICE BRENNAN observed in his dissenting opin-
ion in Broadrick: 
'We have never held that a statute should be held invalid 
on its face merely because it is possible to conceive of a 
single impermissible application, and in that sense a re-
quirement of substantial overbreadtb is already implicit 
in the doctrine." 413 U. S., at 630. 
The requirement of substantial overbreadtb is directly de-
rived from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a 
sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the po-
tential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity 
by many indh;duals, the extent of deterrence of protected 
speech can be expected to decrease with the declining reach 
of the regulation. r. This observation appears equally appli-
cable to the publication of books and films as it is to activities, 
such as picketing or participation in election campaigns, 
which have previously been categorized as involving conduct 
plus speech. We see no appreciable difference between the 
position of a publisher or bookseller in doubt as to the reach 
First Amendment Ancillary Doctr.nes, 4 Maryland L. Rev. 679, il2-714 
(1978); Note, First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 
844, 860-861 (1970). 
•In Good.i7UJ v. WiUon, 405 U. S. 518, 527 (1972), the Court's invalida· 
tion of a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to use "opprobrious 
words or abusive language tending to cauae a breach of the peace" followed 
from state judicial decisions indicating that "merely to speak words offen-
sive to some who hear them" could constitute a "breach of the peace." 
Cases invalidating laws requiring members of a "subversive organiz.ation" 
to take a loyalty oath, Baggett v. Bullitt., 377 U. S. 360 (1964), or register 
with the government, Domlrrowski v. Pfiater, 380 U. S. 479 (1965), can be 
explained on the basis that the laws involved, unlike § 263.15, defined no 
central core of constitutionally regulable conduct; the en~ scope of the 
laws was subject to the uncertainties and vagaries of prosecutori.a.J discre-
tion. See al&o Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 817 (1975) ("the fact of 
this case well illustrate 'the statute's potential for sweeping and improper 
applications."') (citation omitted); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 
(1963) ("We read the decree of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appea.18 ... 
a.E proscribing any arrangement by which prospective litigants are advised 
to seek the assistance of particular attorneys."); Th.om.kill v. Alabama, 
310 U. S. 88, 9"l (1940) (the statute "does not aim specifically at evil! within 
the allowable are.a of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its 
ambit other activities that in ordinary cireumst.a.nces constitute an exerciae 
of freedom of speech or of the press."). 
""A substantial overbreadth ru.le is implicit in the chilling effect ration· 
ale ... the presumption must be that only substantially overbroad laws set 
up the kind and degree of ch.ill that is judicially cogniz.a.ble."' Moreover, 
··without a substantial overbreadth limitation, re'-iew for overbreadth 
would be draconian indeed. It is difficult to think of a law that is utterly 
devoid of potent:i&l for unconstitutionality in some conceivabie application." 
Note, first Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev., at 859 
and n. 61. 
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of New .1. u111. ::s clll.lu pornograpny i.aw ana tne situation face< 
by the Oklahoma state employees with respect to that state'i 
rest..'"iction on partisan politiCAI activity. Indeed, it couJc 
reasonably be argued that the bookseller, with an economic 
incentive to sell materials that may fall within the statute's 
scope, may be less likely to be deterred than the employee 
who wishes to engage in political campaign activity. er. 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 38()..381 (1977) 
(overbreadtb analysis inapplicable to commercial speech). 
This requirement of substantial overbreadtb may justifi. 
ably be applied to statutory challenges which arise in defense 
of a criminal prosecution as well as civil enforcement or ac-
tions seeking a declaratory judgment. Cf. Parker v. Levy, 
417 U. S. 733, 760 (1974). Indeed, the Court's practice when 
confronted with ordinary eriminal laws that are sought to be 
applied against protected conduct is not to invalidate the law 
in t.ot.o, but rather to reverse the particular conviction. 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1973). We recognize, how-
ever, that the penalty to be imposed is relevant in determin-
ing whether demonstrable overbreadth is substantial. We 
simply hold that the fact that a criminal prohibition is in-
volved does not obviate the need for the inquiry or a priori 
warrant a finding of substantial overbreadth. 
B 
Applying these principles, § 263.15 is not substantially 
overbroad. We consider this the paradigmatic case of a 
state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably im· 
permissible applications. New York, as we have held, may 
constitutionally prohibit dissemination of material specified 
in § 263.15. 'While the reach of the statute is directed at the 
hard core of child pornography, the Court of Appeals was un-
derstandably concerned that some protected expression, 
ranging from medical textbooks to pictorials in National Geo-
graphic would fall prey to the statute. How often, if ever, it 
may be necessary to employ children to engage in conduct 
clearly within the reach of the § 263.15 in order to produce 
educational, medical or artistic works cannot be known with 
certainty. Yet we seriously doubt, and it has not been sug-
gested, that these arguably impermissible applications of the 
statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials 
within the statute's reach. Nor will we assume that the 
New York courts will widen the possibly invalid reach of the 
statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscrip-
tion on "1ewd exhibitionfsJ of the genitals." Under these cir· 
cumstances. § 263.15 is "not substantially overbroad and 
whatever o~erbreadth exists should be cured through c.ase-
by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, 
assertedly, may not be applied." Broadrick v. Oklalwrrw., 
413 U. S .. at 615-616. 
IV 
Because § 263.15 i.s not substantially overbroad, it is wmec· 
essary to consider its application to material that does not de-
pict sexual conduct of a type that New York may restrict con· 
sistent with the First Amendment. As applied to Paul 
Ferber and to others who distribute similar material, the 
statute does not violate the First Amendment as applied to 
the States through the Fourteenth. 211 The decision of the 
" There iB no argument that the films sold by respondent do not fall 
squarely within the category of act.hi~· we have defined as unprot.Kted. 
Therefore. no independent examination of the materilJ i!! nec"t'!SS.."Y to Bl"" 
sure ourselves that the jud~ent here .. does not constitute a forbidden in-
trusion on the field of free expression." New York Timu \'. Sullii'lln, 376 
u. s. 2.54, 285 (1964). 
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New York Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is re-
manded to that Court for further proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion. 
So ardemi. 
JUSTICE Bl..ACKMUN concurs in the result. 
Ju~TICE O'CONNOR, concurring. 
Although I join the Court's opinion, I write separately to 
stress that the Court does not hold that New York must ex-
cept "material ·with serious literary, scientific or educational 
value," ante, at 19, from its statute. The Court merely holds 
that, even if the First Amendment shelters such material, 
New York's current statute is not sufficiently overbroad to 
support respondent's facial attack. The compelling interests 
identified in today's opinion, see ante, at 9-16, suggest that 
the Constitution might in fact permit New York to ban know-
ing distribution of works depicting minors engaged in explicit 
sexual conduct, regardless of the social value of the depic-
tions. For example, a 12-year-old child photographed while 
masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm 
whether the community labels the photograph "edifying" or 
"tasteless." The audience's appreciation of the depiction is 
simply irrelevant to New York's asserted interest in protect-
ing children from psychological, emotional, and mental harm. 
An exception for depictions of serious social value, more-
over, would actually increase opportunities for the content-
based censorship disfavored by the First Amendment. As 
drafted, New York's statute does not attempt to suppress 
the communication of particular ideas. The statute permits 
discussion of child sexuality, forbidding only attempts to ren-
der the "portrayal[s] somewhat more 'realistic' by utilizing or 
photographing children." Ante, at 15. Thus, the statute at-
tempts to protect minors from abuse without attempting to 
restrict the expression of ideas by those who might use chil-
dren as live models. 
On the other hand, it is quite possible that New York's 
statute is overbroad because it bans depictions that do not ac-
tuallv threaten the harms identified by the Court. For ex-
ampie, clinical pictures of adolescent sexuality, such as those 
that might appear in medical textbooks, might not involve 
the type of sexual exploitation and abuse targeted by New 
York's statute. Nor might such depictions feed the poison-
ous "kiddie porn" market that New York and other States 
have attempted to regulate. Similarly, pictures of children 
engaged in rites ~;dely approved by their cultures, such ~ 
those that might appear in issues of National Geographic, 
might not trigger the compelling interests identified by the 
Court. It is not necessary to address these possibilities fur-
ther today, however, because this potential overbreadth is 
not sufficiently substantial to warrant facial invalidation of 
New Y ark's statute. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, 
concuning in the judgment. 
I agree with much of what is said in the Court's opinion. 
A1' I ma.de clear in the opinion I delivered for the Court in 
Ginslm:rg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), the State has a 
special interest in prot~g the well-being of its youth. 
Id., at 638-641. See also Globe Newspapers v. Superior 
Court, - U. S. -, - (1982) (slip. op. at 11). This 
special and compelling interest, and the particular vulnerabil-
ity of c..iUldren, afford the State the leeway to regulate porncr 
graphic material, the promotion of which is harmful to chil-
dren, even though the State does not have such leeway when 
it seeks only to protect consenting adults from exposure to 
such material. Gimburg v. New York, supra, at 637, 638 
n. 6, 642-643, n. 10. See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 
184, 195 (1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J .). I also agree with 
the Court that the "tiny fraction", ante, at 25, of material of 
serious artistic, scientific or educational value that could con-
ceivably fall within the reach of the statute is insufficient to 
justify striking the statute on the grounds of overbreadth. 
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 630 (1973) 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
But in my view application of § ~.15 or any similar stat-
ute to depictions of children that in themselves do have seri-
ous literary, artistic, scientific or medical value, would vio-
late the First Amendment. As the Court recogniz.es, the 
limited classes of speech, the suppression of which does not 
raise serious First Amendment concerns, have two at-
tributes. They are of exceedingly "slight social value," and 
the State has a compelling interest in their regulation. See 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 
(1942). The First Amendment value of depictions of children 
that are in themselves serious contributions to art, literature 
or science, is, by definition, simply not "de minimis." See 
ante, at 14. At the same time, the State's interest in sup-
pression of such materials is likely to be far less compelling. 
For the Court's assumption of harm to the child resulting 
from the "permanent record" and "circulation" of the child's 
"participation," ante, at 10, lacks much of its force where the 
depiction is a serious contribution to art or science. The pro-
duction of materials of serious value is not the "low-profile 
clandestine industry" that according to the Court produces 
purely pornogrphic materials. See ante, at 11. In short, it 
is inconceivable how a depiction of a child that is itself a seri-
ous contribution to the world of art or literature or science 
can be deemed "material outside the protection of the First 
Amendment." See a:nte, at 15. 
I, of course, adhere to my view that, in the absence of ex-
posure, or particular harm, to juveniles or unconsenting 
adults the State lacks power to suppress sexually oriented 
materials. See, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 
u. s. 49, 73 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). With this un-
derstanding, I concur in the Court's judgment in this case. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
Two propositions seem perfectly clear to me. First, the 
specific conduct that gave rise to this criminal prosecution is 
not protected by the Federal Constitution; second, the state 
statute that respondent violated prohibits some conduct that 
is protected by the First Amendment. The critical question, 
then, is whether this respondent, to whom the statute may 
be applied without. violating the Constitution, may challenge 
the statute on the ground that it conceivably may be applied 
unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the 
Court. I agree with the Court's answer to this question but 
not with its method of analyzing the issue. 
Before addressing that issue, I shall explain why respond-
ent's conviction d0es not violate the Constitution. The two 
films that respondent sold contained nothing more than lewd 
exhibition; there is no claim that the films included any mate-
rial that had literary, artistic, scientific, or educational 
value. 1 Respondent was a willing participant in a commer-
1 Respondent's couruoel conceded at oral argument tha.t a finding that the 
films are obscene would have been coMistent with the Miller definition. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. 
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cial market that the State of New York has a legitimate inter-
est in suppressing. The character of the State's interest in 
protecting children from sexual abuse justifies the imposition 
of criminal sanctions against those who profit, directly or in-
directly, from the promotion of such films. In this respect 
my evaluation of this case is different from the opinion I have 
expressed concerning the imposition of criminal sanctions for 
the promotion of obscenity in other contexts. 2 
A holding that respondent may be punished for selling 
these two films does not require us to conclude that other 
users of these very films, or that other motion pictures con-
taining similar scenes, are beyond the pale of constitutional 
protection. Thus, the exhibition of these films before a leg-
islative committee studying a proposed amendment to a state 
law, or before a group of research scientists studying human 
behavior, could not. in my opinion, be made a crime. More-
over, it is at least concei\·able that a serious work of a.rt, a 
documentary on behavioral problems, or a medical or psychi-
atric teaching device, might include a scene from one of these 
films and. when viewed as a whole in a proper setting, be en-
titled to constitutional protection. The question whether a 
specific act of communication is protected by the First 
Amendment alwars requires some consideration of both its 
content and its context. 
The Court's holding that this respondent may not challenge 
New York's statute as overbroad follows its discussion of the 
contours- of the category of nonobscene child pornography 
that ~ew York may legitimately prohibit. Ha\'ing defined 
that category in an abstract setting,'1 the Court makes the 
empirical judgment that the arguably impermissible applica-
tion of the New York statute amounts to only a "tiny fraction 
of the materials within the statute's reach." Ante, at 25. 
Even assuming that the Court's empirical analysis is sound,' 
I believe a more conservative approach to the issue would ad-
equately- vindicate the State's interest in protecting its chil-
dren and cause less harm to the federal interest in free 
expression. 
A hypothetical example will illustrate my concern. As-
sume that the operator of a New York motion picture theater 
specializing in the exhibition of foreign feature films is of-
fered a full-length movie containing one scene that is plainly 
zsee Burck v. Lou:isia.na, 441 u. s. 130, 139 (STEVENS, J., concurring); 
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U. S. 293, 305 (STEVENS, J., concurring); 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223, 245 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Smith v. 
Fnited States, 431 U. S. 291, 311-321 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Marks v. 
United States, 430 U. S. 188, 198 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Stt also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 
61, 84 <STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
daticm, 4-38 U. S. 726, 750 (Opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
'"The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity stand-
ard enu.Iiciated in Jf ille-r, but may be compared to it for pu..'"'pose of clarity. 
The .Willer fonnuiation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact 
need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the aver-
age person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a 
patently offensive manner: and the material at issue need not be considered 
as a whole." A nle. at 16. 
'The Court's analysis is di.reC'ted entirely at the permissibility of the 
statute's coverage of nonobscene material. Its empirical e\-idence, how-
ever, is drawn substantia.lly from congressional committ~ reports that ul-
timately reached the conclusion that a prohibition against obacene child 
pornography-coupled with sufficiently stiff sanctions-is an adequate re-
sponse to this social problem. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
concluded that "''irtuallv all of the materials tha.t art' norma.1.lY considered 
child pornography are obscene under the current standards,., ~d tha.t "[i)n 
comparison with this blatant pornography, non-obscene materials that de-
pict children are very few and very inconsequential." S. Rep. No. 438, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1977); see also H.R. Rep. No. 696, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess., 7~ (1977). The coverage of the federal statute is limited to ob-
scene material See 18 U. S. C. § Z252(a). 
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lewd if viewed in isolation but that nevertheless is part of a 
serious work of.art. If the child actor resided abroad, Xew 
York's interest in protecting its young from sexual exploita-
tion would be far less compelling than in the case before us. 
The federal interest in free expression would, however, be 
just as strong as if an ::.d!l!t .actor had been ~~':?d. Thi:>!"<? lli-c 
at least three different \\•ays to deal with the statute's pct~~: 
tial application to that sort of case. 
First, at one extreme and as the Court appears to hold, the 
First Amendment inquiry might he limited to determining 
whether the offensive scene, viewed in isolation, is lewd. 
When the constitutional protection is narrowed in this drastic 
fashion, the Court is probably safe in concluding that only a 
tiny fraction of the materials covered by the ~ ew York stat-
ute is protected. And with respect to my hypothetical ex-
hibitor of foreign films, he need have no uncertainty about 
the permissible application of the statute~ for the one lewd 
scene would deprive the entire film of any constitutional 
protection. 
Second, at the other extreme and as the New York Court 
of Appeals correctly perceived, the application of this Court's 
cases requiring that an obscenity determination be based on 
the artistic value of a production taken as a whole would af-
ford the exhibitor constitutional proteetion and result in a 
holding that the statute is invalid because of its overbreadth. 
Under that approach, the rationale for invalidating the entire 
statute is premised on the concern that the exhibitor's under-
standing about its potential reach could cause him to engage 
in self censorship. This Court's approach today substitutes 
broad, unambiguous state-imposed eensorsrjp for the self 
censorship that an overbroad statute might produce. 
Third, as an intermediate position, I would refuse to apply 
overbreadth analysis for reasons unrelated to any prediction 
concerning the relative nwnber of protected communications 
that the statute may prohibit. Specifically, I would post-
pone decision of my hypothetical case until it actually a.-rises. 
Advocates of a liberal use of overbreadth analvsis could ob-
ject to such postponement on the ground that it creates the 
risk that the exhibitor's uncertainty may produce self censor· 
ship. But that risk obviously interferes less with the inter-
est in free expression than does an abstract, advance ruling 
that the film is simply unprotected whenever it contains a 
lewd scene I no matter how brief. 
My reasons for avoiding overbreadth analysis in this case 
are more qualitative than quantitatjve. 'When we follow our 
traditional practice of adjudicating difficult and novel con-
stitutional questions only in concrete factual situations, the 
adjudications tend to be crafted \\ith greater \.\isdom. Hy-
pothetical rulings are inherently tr~acherous and prone to 
lead us into unforeseen errors: they are qualitath·ely Jess reli-
able than the products of case-by-case a.djudication. 
Moreover, it is probably safe to assume that the category 
of speech that is covered by the :-; ew York statute gener.Jly 
is of a lower quality than most other types of communication. 
On a number of occasions, I have expressed the view that the 
First Amendment affords some forms of speech more protec· 
tion from governmental regulation than other forms of 
speech.• Today the Court accepts this view, putting the cat· 
~See. e. g .. Sch.ad \'. Borough of .lfo11nt Erihraim. supra. at 80. 83 
(STE\'ENS. J .. concurring in the judgment!; C~nsolidated .Edison Co. \'. 
Public Seri.i.ce Comm·n, ~i l'. S. 530, ~ iSTEVEXS. J., eoncurring 
in the judgment); FCC v. Pc.c-ifica Foundation, supro, at 7+;.-i4S (Opinion 
of STEV!:ss, J.); Ca~ v. Pop-ulaticm Sm.ices Jn.terno.tior;a!. 431 t:. S. 
678, 716-717 (STEVENS, J ., concurring in pan and concurr.ng in the judg-
ment); Smith v. United State.!, supra, at 317-319 (STEVENS, J .. dissent· 
ing); You?lg v. American Mini Theatre8. Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66-71 (Opinion 
o( STEVENS, J.). 
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egory Ot speecn aescnoea ID t.ne I'iew l on,; Statute in ita 
rightful place near the bottom of this hierarchy. Ante, at 
14-15. Although I disagree with the Court's position that 
such speech i.s totally ~"ithout First Amendment protection, I 
agree that generally marginal s~h does not warrant the 
extraordinary protection afforded by the overbreadth 
doctrine.• 
Because I have no difficulty with the statute's application 
in this case, I concur in the Court's judgmenL 
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